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G--W Time: 09.25 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge John T. M~tchell 
Capstar Radlo Operating Company vs Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judae 
















1 111 312002 HRSC THORNE 
NOTH SATERFIEL 
1 111 412002 AFSV SMITH 
AFSV SMITH 
1 111 512002 HRHD THORNE 
1 1 121 12002 ORDR THORNE 
12/2/2002 GLASS 
NOAP GLASS 
12/20/2002 NOTC SMITH 
111 412003 N OTC HILDRETH 
511 212003 NOTC SMITH 
7/22/2003 AFFD NORIEGA 
New Case Filed John T. Mitchell 
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No John T. Mitchell 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Owens, James 
Receipt number: 0545626 Dated: 1 1 /07/2002 
Amount: $77.00 (Check) 
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Conrad Agte in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Temporary Trestraining Order 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Temporary Restraining Order 
Summons Issued John T. Mitchell 
Temporary Restraining Order Issued John T. Mitchell 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 545778 Dated John T. Mitchell 
1 1/08/2002 for 1 000.00) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of John T. Mitchell 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks Receipt 
number: 0545779 Dated: 11/08/2002 Amount: 
$3.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same John T. Mitchell 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks Receipt 
number: 0545779 Dated: 11/08/2002 Amount: 
$1 .OO (Check) 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction John T. Mitchell 
1 111 512002 09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit Of Service John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit Of Service John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Preliminary lnjunction held on John T. Mitchell 
1 111 512002 09:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Preliminary Injunction Order John T. Mitchell 
Filing: I IA  - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than John T. Mitchell 
$1 000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Ian Smith 
Receipt number: 05481 82 Dated: 12/02/2002 
Amount: $47.00 (Check) 
Notice Of Appearance ONLY John T. Mitchell 
Notice of First Access John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Second Access John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Third Access John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor In Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 
For Temporary Restraining Order 
8/26/2003 MNWD SATERFIEL Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney -- Ian John T. Mitchell 
Smith for Defendants 




T~rne 09:25 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 12 Case CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge. John T M~tchell 
Capstar Radlo Operal~ng Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta1 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw John T. Mitchell 
1011 012003 03:OO PM) 
HRSC THORNE 






Application for Fifth Access John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion/Application for Fifth Access Order 
HRVC THORNE Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on John T. Mitchell 











Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
Substitution Of Counsel Sanuel Eismann John T. Mitchell 
Order Granting Request For Fifth Access John T. Mitchell 
Answer John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference John T. Mitchell 









Notice of Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Fourth Access John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Fifth Acces John T. Mitchell 






Notice Of Deposition of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Appearance (Douglas Lawrence, Pro John T. Mitchell 
s e  
MOTN LEITZKE Defendant Lawrence's Motion Requesting the John T. Mitchell 
Court Enter an Order in Limine Against Plaintiff 
Which is Pertinent to the Unanswered and 
Incomplete Discovery 
MNCL LEITZKE Defendant Lawrence's Motion To Compel Plaintiff John T. Mitchell 
to Answer Defendant Lawrence's First 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
1211 112003 04:OO PM: Hearing Held 
HRHD THORNE 
HRSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 









Notice of Trial Setting John T. Mitchell 
Order For Mediation John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Appearance1 Brenda Lawrence Pro Se John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 





Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
Date. 1/9/2009 Firpg$*udicial District Court - Kootenai CountpG3 User VICTORIN 
<@&-y %;g8*# 
T~me 09.25 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: John T. M~tchell 
Capstar Radlo Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta1 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
3/9/2004 AFFD VlCTORlN Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD VlCTORlN 
VlCTORlN Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 
MEMO 
Motion For Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell MNSJ 
NOHG 




Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/14/2004 08:30 John T. Mitchell 
AM) 
H RSC THORNE Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel John T. Mitchell 
04/29/2004 03:OO PM) 
HRVC THORNE Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 04/06/2004 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
311 712004 M OTN Motion For Extension of Time to Answer John T. Mitchell 
discovery 
New File Created John T. Mitchell 
**X******** File 2 of 2 ************* 
FILE DRAPER 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 3/22/2004 NOHG 
3/23/2004 MNCL 
DRAPER 
NORIEGA Defendant Douglas Lawrence's Motion To John T. Mitchell 
Compel Plaintiff Capstar to Answer Defendant 
Douglas Larwence's First lnterrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents 
MOTN NORIEGA Defendants Lawrences' Motion Requesting the John T. Mitchell 
Court Enter an Order in Limine Against Plaintiff 
Capstar Which is Pertinent to the Unanswered 
Discovery 
AFFD NORIEGA Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Douglas Lawrence's Motion to 
Compel Plaintiff Capstar to Answer Defendant 
Lawrence's First lnterrogatories and First 
Request for Production of Documents 
Defendants Lawrences Reply In Opposition to John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
MlSC NORIEGA 
AFFD NORIEGA Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant Douglas Lawrence's First Set of John T. Mitchell 
Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff Capstar 
MlSC NORIEGA 
AFFD NAYLOR Affidavit of John W Mack in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
3/24/2004 NOHG ROBINSON Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Date 1/9/2009 Firg%*dicial District Court - Kootenai Counwr, User VICTORIN 
-4/' ww6 T ~ m e  09.25 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge. John T M~tchell 
Capstar Radlo Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
MOTN Defendants Lawrences' Motion To Vacate the 
April 14th Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgement and To Request a 
Continuance to Review Plaintiffs Answers to 
Defendants Discovery and To Take the 
Deposition of Harold Fund and Others 







Notice Of Service Of Discovery John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Kelvin Brownsberger 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Opposition to 
Lawrence's Motion to Vacate the April 14, 2004 
Summary Judgment Hearing 
Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 




NORIEGA Motion for Protective Order and Limitation of 
Discovery 
NORIEGA Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
John T. Mitchell MlSC 
Brief in Support of Motion for Protective Order 
and Limitation of Discovery 
John T. Mitchell MlSC NORIEGA 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on 04/14/2004 08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
John T. Mitchell HRHD THORNE 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 







Motion for Final Entry of Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider 
05/20/2004 10:OO AM) 
VlCTORlN Defendants Lawrences' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court's Partial Summary 
Judgment of April 14, 2004 
John T. Mitchell MOTN 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 









Motion to Shorten Time 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 
04/29/2004 03:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held 
THORNE Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on 
05/20/2004 10:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
John T. Mitchell H RVC 
Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on 
08/09/2004 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
John T. Mitchell HRVC THORNE 
Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued John T. Mitchell 




JANUSCH Notice Of Appearance-John Whalen for Douglas 
Lawrence 
Affidavit of Retention of John Whelan John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 







Affidavit of Retention 
Civil Disposition entered for: Capstar Radio 
Operating Company, Plaintiff; Lawrence, Brenda 
J, Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant. 
order date: 06/07/2005 
Date 11912009 Firp+~$dicial District Court - Kootenai Count~3~ User VICTORIN 
4-i  
F2-g 
T~me 0925 AM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge. John T. Mitchell 
Capstar Radlo Operat~ng Company vs Douglas P Lawrence, eta1 
Capstar Rad~o Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
FJDE 
STAT 
VlCTORlN Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
and Entering Decree of Quiet Title 
DUBE Case status changed: closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action. Closed in District Court. Appeal filed 
7/7/05 and Bond Posted. 
VICTOR IN Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0658477 
Dated: 07/07/2005 Amount: $9.00 (Check) 
BNDC VlCTORlN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 658478 Dated John T. Mitchell 











Clerk's Certificate of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Lodging Transcript John T. Mitchell 
Receipt For Records John T. Mitchell 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 667855 Dated John T. Mitchell 





Receipt for Records John T. Mitchell 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489841 John T. Mitchell 
dated 10/06/2005 amount 24.80) 
BNDV MCCOY Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489842 John T. Mitchell 











Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 1,000.00) John T. Mitchell 
********** File #3 Created********** John T. Mitchell 
Supreme Court Opinion John T. Mitchell 
Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John T. Mitchell 




Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 0611 312007 03:OO PM) set 
W/CV03-4621 - Weeks 
HRSC 
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO VlCTORlN 






Renewed motion for summary judgment John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
05/14/2007 03:OO PM: Hearing Held Set 
W/CVO3-4621 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
12/10/2007 09:OO AM) 4 Days 
HRSC CLAUSEN 
Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell CLAUSEN 
VlCTORlN Amended Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell ANHR 




T ~ m e  09.25 AM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge John T. M~tchell 
Capstar Rad~o Operat~ng Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta1 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 


























Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Enlargement 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0611 312007 03:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Enlargement of Time; Shorten Time and 
Disqualification for Cause - Whelan 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Renewed John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of John Whelan John T. Mitchell 
Application for Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Disqualify John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Filed 5-30-07 & Notice of Hearing 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of John John T. Mitchell 
Mack Filed 5/30/07 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0611 312007 03:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Set WlCV03-4621 - Weeks - Strike Affd 
John Mack & Portion Affd Doug Lawrence 
Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated Set WlCV03-4621 
- Weeks - Strike Affd John Mack & Portion Affd 
Doug Lawrence 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 0611 312007 03:OO PM: Hearing Held set 
WlCV03-4621 - Weeks 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:OO PM: Hearing Held Enlargement of Time; 
Shorten Time and Disqualification for Cause - 
Whelan 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 08/07/2007 04:OO PM) Weeks - Set 
wICR03-4621 
Motion for Reconsideration John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Permission to Appeal from an John T. Mitchell 
Interlocutory Order 
Affidavit of John P Whelan John T. Mitchell 
Date 1/9/2009 Firp2Aaudicial District Court - Kootenai Counp=- &* & User VICTORIN 
T ~ m e  09.25 AM ROA Report 
Page 7 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: John T. M~tchell 
Capstar Radro Operat~ng Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta1 
Capstar Radio Operatmy Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Dale Code User Judge 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM) Whelan - set 
WICR03-462 1 
John T. Mitchell 711 012007 HRSC 
HRSC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2007 01 :30 
PM) Permission to Appeal - Whelan 
John T. Mitchell CLAUSEN 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 









AMENDED Notice Of Hearing 
Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan 






********** File #4 Created********** John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P 
Whelan 
Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. 
Whelan (with Exhibit Attached) 
John T. Mitchell AFFD HULL 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff 











Request for Judicial Notice John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Enlargement 
Motion to Strike 
Notice Of Hearing 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of 
Opposition to Summary Judgment 
New File Created--File 5 of 5 
******** EXPANDO***** containing Certificates of 
Exhibits dated March 23,2004 
John T. Mitchell FlLE NAYLOR 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:OO 
PM) Enlargement of Time; Strike & Request for 
Judicial Notice - Whelan 
John T. Mitchell 7/26/2007 HRSC CLAUSEN 
plaintiff's opposition to defs motion for 
reconsideration 
7/30/2007 MlSC MCCORD John T. Mitchell 
713 112007 MlSC H U FFMAN Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative for 
Enlargement of Time to File Responses 





New File Created ***6***** John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence filed July 24, 2007 
Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike 
Lawrence Testimony 





Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell PARKER 
Date. 1/9/2009 Fir#5zkudicial District Court  - Kootenai CountfZ: User VICTORIN 
Vz&$if 
T~me: 09:25 AM ROA Report 
Page8of  12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current: Judge John T M~tchell 
Capstar Rad~o Operat~ng Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operat~ng Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
DENY CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John T. Mitchell 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM: Motion Denied Whelan - 
set WICR03-4621 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/06/2007 John T. Mitchell 





Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
and Motion for Permissive Appeal 
ORDR 
CONT Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 08/07/2007 04:OO PM: Continued 
Weeks - Set wlCR03-4621 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:OO PM: Motion Held Enlargement of Time; 
Strike & Request for Judicial Notice - Whelan 
HELD CLAUSEN 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 09/24/2007 04:OO PM) 1 hour 
HRSC CLAUSEN 
Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell CLAUSEN 
MCCORD plaintiffs Motion for protective order re. def's John T. Mitchell 
notice of deposition 
MOTN 
Objection to notice of deposition & demand for John T. Mitchell 
production of documents 
OBJT MCCORD 
Notice Of Delivery Of Original Transcript John T. Mitchell NOTC 
MlSC 
BARKER 
HUFFMAN Amended Notice of Deposition and Demand for John T. Mitchell 
Production of Documents 
Subpoena Duces Tecum John T. Mitchell MlSC 
NOTC 
MCCOY 
MCCOY Notice of Deposition and Demand for Production John T. Mitchell 
of Documents 
AMENDED Notice of Deposition and Demand for John T. Mitchell 
Production of Documents 
NOTC MCCOY 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer John T. Mitchell MOTN 
AFFD 
VlCTORlN 
VlCTORlN Affidavit of John Whelan in Suppoer of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
AFFD VlCTORlN Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Suppoer of John T. Mitchell 
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
MlSC VlCTORlN Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff 
VlCTORlN 
CLAUSEN 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell NOHG 
ORDR Order Denying Defendants' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Reconsideration 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Defendants' Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement and Granting Continuance of 
Summary Judgment 
Date 11912009 Firg$9jjudicial District Court - Kootenai CounW'2, 
q.?F * $z<g User VlCTORlN ez- 
T~me: 09.25 AM ROA Report % 
Page 9 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge John T M~tchell 
Capstar Radlo Operatlng Company vs Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 





























CLAUSEN Order Granting Defendants' Request for Judicial John T. Mitchell 
Notice of the Court Files 
CLAUSEN Order on Defendants' Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
GBROWN Notice Of Transcript Delivery of Harold Funk John T. Mitchell 
PARKER Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Doug John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence filed September 10,2007 
PARKER Plaintiffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in John T. Mitchell 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
PARKER Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
PARKER Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
VlCTORlN ********** File #7 Created********** John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Pleadings or in the Alternative for Enlargement of 
Time 
CLAUSEN Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007 
GBROWN Motion John T. Mitchell 
GBROWN Motion John T. Mitchell 
HUFFMAN Motion to Correct Judgment John T. Mitchell 
HUFFMAN Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 09/24/2007 04:OO PM: Hearing Held 1 
hour 
CLAUSEN Order on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer John T. Mitchell 
GBROWN Notice Of Service of Discovery John T. Mitchell 
GBROWN Notice Of Transcript Delivery for Kosta Panidis John T. Mitchell 
and Kent Abendroth 
HUFFMAN Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10131 12007 04:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Allow Access - Weeks 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1013112007 04:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Shorten Time - Weeks 
CLAUSEN Application for Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Notice Of Hearing on Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Notice Of Hearing of Hearing on Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Shorten Time 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 10/31/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:OO PM: Motion Granted Shorten Time - 
Weeks 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 10131 12007 John T. Mitchell 
04:OO PM: Motion Granted Allow Access - 
Weeks 
Date 111912009 Fir~3Audicial District Court - Kootenai CounQ**- 
&#& * User VICTORIN 
+",a? 
Trme 09.25 AM ROA Report w 
Page 10 of 12 Case, CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge John T Mrtchell 
Capstar Radro Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operatrng Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 








Order Granting Request for Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 
Objection to Form of Order Granting Sixth Access John T. Mitchell 






Renewed Motion To Disqualify for Cause John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of Renewed John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Disqualification 
Notice Of Hearing - Renewed Motion for DQ John T. Mitchell NOTH 
HRSC 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Renewed Motion for DQ - Whelan 112 hour 
NOTC CLAUSEN Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Dated 817107 
Notice of Delivery of Original transcript from John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Dated 6113107 
NOTC CLAUSEN 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell NOHG 
MOTN 
LSMITH 
VlCTORlN Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from John T. Mitchell 





Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John T. Mitchell 









Motion To Continue Trial John T. Mitchell 
Notice of Change of Address John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Service Susan P Weeks by Fax John T. Mitchell 
1 111 2107 






New File Created**** ************** 7 John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1112712007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal - 
Whelan 








Exhibit List John T. Mitchell 
Witness List John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Denied Renewed Motion for 
DQ - Whelan 112 hour 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Held Renewed Motion for 
Permissive Appeal - Whelan 
HELD CLAUSEN 
Date. 1/9/2009 Fir*?;$gdieial District Court - Kootenai Countw- 122s User VICTORIN 
T~me 09.25 AM 
?kc,." 
ROA Report 
Page 11 o f12  Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: John T. M~tchell 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John T. Mitchell 
11/27/2007 0330 PM: Motion Granted Court 
Trial - Weeks 
GRNT CLAUSEN 
Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 




CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
06/09/2008 09:OO AM) 5 Days 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
ORDR Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to 
Appeal From an Interlocutory Order 
Expert Witness Disclosure John T. Mitchell MlSC 
NOTC 
SHEDLOCK 
CLAUSEN Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from John T. Mitchell 
1 1/27/07 
Expert Witness Disclosure of Defendants John T. Mitchell 




Memorandum Decision and Order Granting John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 
06/09/2008 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days 
- I st Priorty 
HRVC 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/23/2008 04:OO John T. Mitchell 
PM) Presentment of Judgment 
HRSC CLAUSEN 
VlCTORlN Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this 
amount to the District Court) Paid by: John 
Whelan Receipt number: 0787292 Dated: 
3/19/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
BNDC Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 787298 Dated John T. Mitchell 











Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal to Supreme Crt John T. Mitchell 
Order-Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
Order Augmenting Appeal John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2008 John T. Mitchell 
04:OO PM: Hearing Vacated Presentment of 
Judgment 






Notice of Transcript Lodged-Julie Foland John T. Mitchell 
Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to John T. Mitchell 
File Clerk's Record 
Receipt Of Clerk's Transcript on 07/28/08 John T. Mitchell RECT 
BNDV 
RABROWN 
ROBINSON Bond Converted (Transaction number 9499657 John T. Mitchell 
dated 8/14/2008 amount 100.00) 
Date: 1/9/2009 
Time: 09:25 AM 
Firgkpiudicial District Court - Kootenai Coun ,iA, 
<>&$&& g2 
;*rsr -&$ ROA Report 
User: VlCTORlN 
Page 12 of 12 Case: CV-2002-0007671 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta1 
Capstar Radio Operating Company vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
9/9/2008 ORDR VICTORIN Order granting motion to Withdraw as Attorney of John T. Mitchell 
RecordlJohn Whelan 
1N THE S U P m M E  COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
2007 .in$3 I !4A9b5 
Doc et No 
CAPSTAR JAN310 O P E U T I N  ~ b ' C 2  -767 ewiston, August 2006 Terrn COMPAJVY, a Delaware corpor 
L' ) 
1 
2007 Opinion No. 13 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
1 
V. 1 Filed: January 26,2007 
) 
DOUGLAS P. L A W m N C E  and BRENDA J. ) 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) 
1 
Defendants-Appellants. 1 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, for the County of Kootenai. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
The sumnary jud,ment order is vacated and the case is remanded. 
John P. Whelan, P.C., Coeur d'Alene, for appellants. John P. Whelan 
argued. 
Owen, James, Vernon and Weeks, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Susan 
P. Weeks argued. 
JONES, Justice 
Capstar Radio Operating Company filed suit to declare the existence of an 
easement over property owned by Douglas and Bresda Lawrence. The Lawrences zppeal 
from the district court's grant of summary judgment finding a twenty foot wide express 
easement across their property. We vacate the summary judgment and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
1. 
The Lawrences and Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain south 
of Post Falls. The "Lawrence parcel" is located in the southeast quarter of section 21 and 
the "Capstar parcel" is located to the east in the southwest quarter of section 22. From a 
public road, known as Signal Point Road, Capstar seeks an easement to access its 
A. 
W e n  revieu~ing an order for sunmary jud,ment, the standard of review for this 
Court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Watson v. 
Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005). Sumrnary judgment is proper 
when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together wittr the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the rnoving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). If there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, "'only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises 
free review." f i t son ,  141 Idaho at 504, 112 P.3d at 792. 
B. 
The Lawrences argue that Capstar, a Delaware corporation, lacks standing to 
bring this suit because it did not have a certificate of authority to operate as a foreign 
corporation in Idaho under I.C. $ 30-1-1502(1). The Lawrences contend that the statute 
is jurisdictional and that Capstar must first prove it has authority to operate in Idaho 
before filing a lawsuit. "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this 
Court before reaching the merits of the case." Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 
391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). 
I.C. Ij 30- 1 - 1502(1) provides that "[a] foreign corporation transacting business in 
this state without a certificate of authority may not maintain a proceeding in any court in 
this state until it obtains a certificate of authority." Assuming without deciding that I.C. 5 
30-1-1502(1) is jurisdictional, the statute is inapplicable here. Capstar owns its property, 
but "transacting business" does not include the ownership of real property. I.C. Ij 30-1- 
1561(2)(i). The Lawrences did not allege any other business Capstar conducted in Idaho 
to cause Capstar to subject itself to the statute, so I.C. 5 30-1-1502(1) is inapplicable 
here. See Gebrueder Heidemann, K.G. v. A.M.R. Corp., 107 Idaho 275, 282, 688 P.2d 
1180, 1187 (1984) (under a similar prior statute, German corporation did not transact 
business in Idaho as statutorily defined, so it was not required to obtain a certificate of 
authority before maintaining an action in Idaho). I.C. 5 30-1-1502(1) does not deprive 
Capstar of standing. 
witldlolding title to a portion of the convqed property." .4kers, 142 Idaho at 301, 127 
P.3d at 204. 
The dislrict court de temhed that the language in the sale agreement was 
unmbiguous and that such language created an express easernent in favor of the Capstar 
parcel. The detemination of whether a document is ambiguous is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises 6ee  review. C 8 G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 
76, 78 (2001). "In the absence of mbiguity, the docment  must be construed in its plain, 
ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of 
the instrument." Id 
The district court apparently concluded for purposes of its bench ruling that the 
easernent was of the first variety mentioned above - one created by a written agreement. 
We thus examine the sale agreement to determine whether the language therein can be 
construed to gan t  an easement over property, then owned by the Funks and now owned 
by the Lawrences in the southeast quarter of Section 21, for the benefit of property in the 
southwest quarter of Section 22, then owned by the Funks and now owned by Capstar. 
In determining that the sale agreement created an express easement the court 
focused upon the following language in paragraph 5: "Subject to and including an 
ingress egress easement over this and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 
owned by the grantor . . ." The question is whether the parties made clear their intention 
to establish a servitude over the Section 21 parcel subsequently acquired by the 
Lawrences for the benefit of other unspecified property owned by the Funks in Sections 
21 and 22. There is nothing in the sale agreement that indicates an immediate grant of 
easement rights. Indeed, the Funks could not then have granted themselves an easement 
over the property being sold to Human Synergistics since they were the record owners of 
fee title at the time. At most, this language gave the Funks the right to obtain an access 
easement over the Lawrence parcel for the benefit of sorne other unspecified property 
owned by the Funks in sections 21 and 22, at such time as the purchase price was paid 
and the deed was delivered in accordance with the sale agreement. This was a title 
retaining contract where the grant of the Lawrence parcel (and the creation of any 
easement over it) was contingent upon the future fulfillment of the sale agreement. The 
holding. La~zguage sinlply 'kescepting" easei~lents "in view and or record," in and of 
itself, would not suffice to make clear the intention of the parties to establish a servitude. 
Further, the Seccambe court, appeared to coduse creation of an easement by reservation 
with creation of one by exception. The Court of Appeals first stated ""we believe the 
evidence supporls the finding of an easement by reservation" ( I  15 Idaho at 435, 767 P.2d 
at 278), but then goes on to hold that the language excepting easements "in view and or 
record'kreated an easement, "whether by reservation or by exception." (1 15 Idaho at 
437, 767 P.2d at 280). It must be one or the other, it can't be both. It is not the intention 
of this Court to ovemle the Seccombe holding but, rather, to advise the parties below that 
it is a fairly slender reed upon whch to cling. 
It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary judmment proceeding 
to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have been brought to a 
conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to Capstar's other theories 
but not considered on s u m a r y  jud,ment. The court indicated that because of 
outstanding discovery, it would not address the other theories being pursued by Capstar. 
It would have been preferable to allow that discovery to be completed so that the court 
would have had the ability to rule on the other theories. 
D. 
Both parties requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. $ 12-121. We will 
award attorney fees if the appeal "was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation." Callaghan v. Cnllaghnn, 142 Idaho 185, 191, 125 P.3d 1061, 1067 
(2005). Neither party acted frivolously in this appeal so we decline to award fees. 
1x1. 
The district court's order for summary judgment is vacated and the case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs or 
fees to either party. 
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, and Justices TROUT and BURDICK CONCUR. 
an easement it1 the real estate contract would be irrelevant. The district court, erred in 
attempting to create an easement based upon the real estate contract. 
I, Stephen W. Kenyon, CIerk of the Supreme Cowt 
of the State of Idaho, do hereby 
above is a true and col~ect c o ~ y  d
entered In the abave bnWIed ca 
record in my Mi. 
66 ~ l ~ ~ ~ s s m y h . n d v * l t t ~ ~ ~ o r a a . c a r &  
STEPHEN W. KENYON 
In the Supreme Court of the Sta 
I 0  OPERATmG COMPANY, a ) 




v. 1 W M I T T I T m  
) 
DOUGLAS P. L A W N C E  and BRENDA J. 1 NO. 32090 
L A W N C E ,  husband and wife, 1 
1 
Defendants-Appellants. 1 
TO: FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI. 
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause January 26, 2007, which 
has now become final; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required. 
DATED this 2oth day of February, 2007 
Clerk of the Supreme Court u 
STATE OF IDAHO 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
PAGE @ L J @ ~  
SUSAN P. WE35TCS 
JAA4ES, VERNON & WrEEKS, P A .  
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Goewr d'Nene. ID 83 8 14 
Tclcphone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
ISB $4255 
Attorneys for PlaintiF 
IN TFJE DISTNCT COURT OF TEE FIRST JUDICXAT, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. TTu' AND FOR THE COLWTY OF KOOTENAT 
CAPSTAR R4.DTO OPEUTTNC COMPANY, 
a Delaware colporatio~l. 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LATVIWNCE, husband and wife, 
I Care No. CV 02-767 1 
I 
R E N E \ i D  MOTION FOR / SINMX'Y JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff; by and through their attorney of record, and moves the 
Court pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 56 for an order panting summary judgment in favor of the above- 
named Plaintiff for relief demanded in the complaint. 
The grounds for this motion arc that there is no gcnuine issue in h s  case as to say 
material fact and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This motion is based 
upon T.R.C.P. 56, the attachcd. memorandum in support of this motion. and the affidavits and 
documents on file hcrein. 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 1 
nn7 
PAGE M2i82 
Oral argument is respectlZll1 y requested. 
DATED this 1 4'h day of May, 2007. 
J44h4ES, VElXNON & WEKS,  P.A. 
.---- 
BY: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hneby certify that on the 14"' day of May, 2007, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of ihe foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
C] U.S. Mail Overnigltt Mail 
d Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Wlielan 
21 3 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alelene, ID 8381 6 
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SUSAN P. W E K S  
J,.\NES, mRNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
15'75 N. Lakewood Drive. Ste. 200 
Caeur d'Alcnc, ID 838 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 663- 1684 
IS8 #4255 
C- L 
CLERK DlSTRiCT COUATd~ " 
Anomeys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 01: THE FIRST JUDICIAL DTSTRTCT OF mE 
STATE OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR R4DTO OPERATING COWANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS I ; A W C E  and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defkndants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
kEMORAmUM IN SUPPORT 
OF R E h T M D  MOTION FOR 
S ~ ~ T V I A R V  JUDGMENT 
The Court's d i n g  that PlaintifThad an express easement in this matter was appealed to 
t l ~ c  Idaho Supreme Court. Tbe Supreme Court ruled here was no express casement. Tlie 
Supreme Caurt noted that it appeased that the case might have been brought to a conclusion 
based upon Capstar's other theories. A remittitur was issued February 20, 2007. 1)efend.mts 
have taken no further a,ction on the case. This renewed summary judgmelxt raises for: tllc Court's 
consideration those other theories of easem.ent advanced by Capstar earlier. Although contained 
in. t11e original s m a r y  judgment. for ease of arguent ,  this memormdm reiterates those Facts 
md nrgunents previously raised. 
I. m ~ ~ ~ ~ u ~ ~ ~  FACTS 
I .  The Defendmts, Doug and Brenda Latwence, own a fee simple interest in red 
property described as the Northeast Quarter of  &:be Southeast Quarter, the East half of the 
Nofiwest Quarter of the Southcast Quclrter and the East half of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter, all located in Section 21, Township SO North, R q e  5 West Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho hereinafter referred to as the "Lawrence parcel". (Answer to Complaint 
2.) 
2. The relevant portions of t l ~ e  chain of title of the Lawrence parcel are as follows: 
Plke W. Reynolds and Agnes E. Reynolds, husband and wife, owned the parent parcel fiom 
whch the Lawrence parcel was later segregated,   hen transferred it to Edward P. Raden and 
Colleen J. Raden, husband and wife, and Harold F. Marcoe and Viola G. Marcoe, husband and 
wife. Radens and Marcoes transferred the parent parcel to Harold A. Funk and klarlene A. Funk. 
husband and wife. Funks segregated and tra~tsferred the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistjcs. 
Inc., a Minnesota corporation. Human Syngergistics, Inc. trarsferred the Lawrence parcei to Don 
E. Johnston and Fern A. Jolmton, Itusband and wife, and .Tolln McHugh and Mary Ann 
h%cHugh, husband and wifc. Johstons and McHughs then transferred t l ~ c  Lawrence parcel to 
National Associated Properties, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. National Associated Properties, Inc. 
transfe'ened tlte Lawrence parcel to Am~an and Mary Jane Famnanian, husband and wife. Arman 
and Mary Jane Fannanian sold the property to Doug and Brenda Lawrence, husband and wife. 
See Weeks Asdavit in Support of Motion for Sumnary Judgment, Exhibits A - 1. 
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3. P1aint;iE Capstar Radio Operating Co. (" Capstar") otvns a parcel of property 
situated in the Sou.thwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 50 Nort11, Range 5 West, Boise 
Metidsan, ICootenai County, Idaho, more pafiiculaiy described as follows: 
Beginning at the Soutl~west corner, a one-half inch iron pipe that bears North 66" 
21' m, 932.30 Cect firom the Soutl-rwest section corner of said Section 22: 
thencc, North 13"37' %Vest, 365.96 feet to a one-half inch iron pipe; thence, Nort11 
76O22' East, 595.09 feet to a one-half inch ison pipe; thencc 3011th 13'37' East, 
366.09 feet to a. one-half inc11 iron pipe; thence Sout1-r 76a23' West, 595.09 feet to 
the POINT OF B E G M G ,  
See Weeks r'tFEdrivit in Support of Motion For Surnxnasy Judgment. Exhibits P througl-r T. This 
pascel of property is identified by the tax asses sol.'^ ofice on its maps as tax parcel 6400. 
4. The relevant portions of the cl~ain of title o f  the Capstar parcel are as follows: 
Prke W. Reynolds and Agnes E. Reynolds, husha~~d and wifc. owned the Soutl~wcst Quarter of 
Section 22, Tomsl ip  50 Koi-tli, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho (pascrtt 
parcel) from whch the Capstar parcel was later segregated. Reynolds transfenad the parent 
parcel to Edward P. Raden and Colleen L. Raden, husband and. wifc, and Harold F. Marcoe and 
Vioia G. Marcoe, h~~sband and wife. Radens and Marcoes i~msfened the parent parcel to Harold 
A. Funk and Marlene A. Funk, l~usband and wife. Funks segregated and transferred the Capstar 
parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting, hc., an Idaho corporation. Kootenni Broadcasting, Inc. then 
transferred a e  Gapstar parcel to Rook Broadcasting of lda110, Inc. Rook Broadcasting 
subsequently transfened the Capstar pasccl to AGM-Nevada, L.L.C., a Nevada Limited Liability 
Company ("AGM"). AGhf then tr-ansFerrcd tho parcel to Gapstar. See W ~ e k s  Midavit  in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits A through D and P through T. 
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5 .  Both the Capstar pace1 and the Lawcnce parcel were held in unity of tide until 
they were se~ega tcd  by Harold and Nlarlene Funk. See Wceks Affidavit. 
6. A private road traverses the Lawrence parcel in the So~ttbeast Quarter of Section 
21. ( h s w c r  to Complaint 75). A survey of this road as it crosses the Lawrencc parcel was 
recorded June 15, 1998 and placed the portion of the private easemelit road in the Soutl~cast 
QuMm of Section 21 as lying within Tax Parcel No. 21-8500- See W e k s  Affidavit in Support o f  
Motion for Smmary Judgment, Exhibit W. The parcel over w11ich tl~is urveyed road js now 
identified as Kootenai County T ~ Y  Parcel No. SON05W-21-9000 because it was segregated from 
Tax Parcel No. 2 1-8500 in 1999 after the survey was recorded. This parcel continues to be 
ocvt~ed by Lawrmces. ,See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion lor Summary .Tudgment, 
Exhibits 0, X and Z. 
7. Tn October 1966, General Telephone Corporation ("GTC") acquired a parcel of 
property from Reynolds located in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 50 North, 
Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Tdaho. The deed granting the parcel jn Section 
22 to GTC also included an access easement over the Southeast Quarter of Section 2 1 (the 
Lawrence Parcel) and the Southwest Quarter of Seeti011 22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, 
Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Tdal~o. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibits U and Exhibit CC, Wenkn Affidavit. h July 1966, GTC obtained 
a kght of Way Easement over the Southwest Quarter of Scction 21, Townsl~ip 50 North, Range 
5 West Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho for access to its equipment situated on Blossom 
Mountain. See Weeks Affida~it in Support of Motion for Surninary Judgment. E,xhbit V. Tn 
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Ar~gust 1966, GTC obtained a Right a€ f q Easement over the N o ~ h  Half of the Nndheast 
Quaer  of Sectian 28, Towship 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Met.idian, Kootenai County, 
Idalllo. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for S u m ~ m y  Judment, Exhibit W. 
8. In 1967, GTC had a detail of the access road prepwed by an engineer, together 
with details of its eammunicntion facility. The detail of the access road showed the private 
easement road as leaving the county road, traversit~g southeast tlrough the Southwes Quarter 
Section of 21, then entering into the 5 0 a h  EIalf o f  Sectian 28 where it traveled southeast for a 
distance in Section 28 and then t m e d  northeast for the remainder of the distance, then entering 
the Southeast Quarter nf Section 21 and &aversing nodheasterly through the Lawrence parcel 
and continuing northeasterly tl-trough the Sor~thwcst Quarter of Section 22. See Weelts Affidavit 
in Support of Motion for S u m a r y  Judgment, Exhibit V. GTC's detail map shows the road in 
the same location as it existed and was used by Funk during h i s  ownersl~ip, and w, it existed and 
was used by Rook during Kootenai Broadcasting, Xnc.'s owersbip. See Funk Affidavit and Rook 
-Affidavit. 
9. The private road used by GTC, Funk and Raok was t11e only existing r o d  that 
provided access to t11e parcels at thc time that Funks purchased the property. See Funk Affidavit. 
10. Tn July 1975, Funks sold the Southeast ?A of the South~ast of Section 21, 
Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian to Human Synergistics, h c .  At the time of 
the sale, Funks continued to own the property located in the Soutl~tvest Quarter of Section 22. 
Whcn the sdcs agreement was di-af?ed, it included a clause to address Frurks' access across the 
Section 21 parcel being sold to allow continued access to their property in Sectior-r 22. Tretn 5 of 
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the ageement indicated that the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an ingess egress 
casement: in favor of the pr0pert.y still held by Funks o v a  the existing road on the propexty that 
was being sold to Human Synergistics. See Weeks Affidavit in Supporl of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhbit E. It was not Funks' intent to land lock their Section 22 property upon the sde 
of the Section 21 property. It was Funks' intent to assure that they retained an easement over the 
existing road located in the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 for ingress and cgress to the propcrty 
they continued to own in Section 22. See Funk Affidavit- Funk continued to use the private road 
for ingress and cgress to Section 22 a.ftcr the sale of the Section 21 property. ,See Fuik Affidavit 
1 1 . In 1959, Funks sold a parcel of property to Capstar's predecessor af record, 
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. At the time of the sale, the only ingress and egress to the: parcel was 
by way of the private road that crossed the Sor~tl~east Quarter of Section 21. See Rook 
12. In 1996, Lawrences' immediate prcdecessots in title, A m m  and Mary Jane 
Fmanian, granted a written easement in favor of John Mack over the private easement For 
ingress and egress to his lands located in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. which he obtained 
h i n  Harold and Marlene Funk. See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary 
.Tttdgment. E ~ b i t  "BB". In granting this easement, Farmanians recognized this private road as 
the "l.liston~ accesst' for Mack and his predecessors in interest used for access to their parcel in 
Section 22. Mack's predecessors in interest were the Funks. ,See Weeks Affidavit in Support of 
P4otion for S~unmary Judgment, Exhibit XI. 
13. The easement road was in view ai: the time Lawrcnces purchased thcir property. 
See Weeks Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary J~rdgment, Exhibits GG and HI-I. 
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If. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 
The law is well established in Idaho that on a lnotion for summary judgment, the triaI 
court must ddemine whether the pleadings, deposition, and sdsnissions, together with affidavits, 
show that t11e1-e is no genuine issue as .lo any material fact md that the moving party is entitled to 
j u d p n t  as a matter of law. T,R.C.P. 56(c); Bonz L%dweeks, 1 19 Idaho 539,54 1 , 808 P.2d 
876.873 (1 99 1 ). The burden of proving the absence of an iss~lc of material fact rests at all dmes 
upon the moving party. McCn)li~ Lyons, 120 Idaho 765. 769,820 P.2d 360,364 ( 1  991); G & M 
firms v. Fmk Irrigation Co., 1 19 Idaho 5 14, 57 7, 808 P.2d 85 1.554 (1991). 
In .lR. Simplot Co. v. Rosen. - Idaho , P.3d - (S.Ct. Opinion 3 1 706.2006). 
the court set forth the requirement when the ca5e is a court trial: 
"When an actioi~ will be tricd belbre the court without a jury, the trial 
court as the trjer of fact is entitled tn arrive at thc most probable infercnccs based 
upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the s u m r o q  judgment 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v.  Huckleberry %tales, 
L.L. C., 140 Idaho 354,360-61,93 P.3d 685,691 -92 (2004). " T ~ E  test far 
reviewing the infercnccs drawl by the trial court is whetl?er the record reasonably 
supports the inferences. " Id 
IJI. BACKGROUND 
As noted above, a private easement road has existed since at least 1 966 which traversed 
portions of Sections 2 1,22 and 28 to access property in the Soutl~wesl; Quarter of Scctioil22, 
Towilship 50 North. Range 5 West Boise Pcllcridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. This casc arises 
froin a dispute regardng the right of Capstar to use the private casement road to access its 
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property in the Southwcst Quarter of Section 22 (Section 22 parcel) as it traverses tbe prope~y in 
the Snu&west Quarter of Section 2 1 (Section 21 parcel) o w e d  by the Lawrences. 
Botll the Capstar Section 22 parcel and the Lawrence Section 2 1 parcel were once part of 
a larger tract held under one common o%mcrsl~ip prior to a division of the parcels by the Fwks. 
A private road existed w l ~ i ~ h  provided access to both parcels. Although its origin is unknow~, it 
is apparent that GTC obtained an easement over the road as early as 1966. Prior to the separation 
by Funks of the Labwences' Section 21 parceI from, the parent parcel, the private road across the 
Section 21 parcel had been used by Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in 
Section 2 1 m d  Section 22. Even irfter the separation of the Section 21 parcel, Funks continued to 
use the private easement road to access their Section 22 pxrcel, and it was later used by ICootcnai 
Broadcasting, Inc. for access to i t s  segregated parcel in Section 22. 
IV. AmGUh4ENT 
A. Easement by Implicatiot~ 
~4.n easement can be formed by implication from prior usc. In order to establish an 
easement; by impli~ation from prior use, the party trying to establish such an casement must 
demonstrate (1) unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by grant of t l ~ e  doininant 
estate; (2) apparent contiiiuous use; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the 
proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Bear Island Wafer A,v,m. v Brown, 125 Idaho 7 17, 
725,874 P.2d 528, 536 (1994); CurdwelI v. Smith, 105 Idalio 71,77,665 P.2d 1081 1087 
(Ct.App. 1983); Close v. Renstnk, 95 Idaho 72,76, SO1 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis v. Gowen, 
83 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d 403,406-407 (1 961). Apparcnt continuous use refers to the use. 
before thc separation of the parceIs that would indicate the roadway was intended to providc 
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pewanent access to the parcels. Card%,ell.i~ Smith, supra, at 78,665 P.2d at 1088. Strict 
neccssity is not required for the creation of an iinplied easement by prior use. All that is required 
is reasonable necessity. Thomas v. )Wadsen, 142 Idaho 635, 1 32 P.3d 392 (2006). The party 
seeking to establish the easelnent has tlte barde11 o f  providing the facts to establish the easement. 
Fr. its later pronouncements, the Idaho Supreme Court expanded the Isw on easements by 
implication in Davis v .  Peacock, 133 Xdalio 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1 999). In Davis, the plaintiEs 
(Davis) sought to protect an easement over the propmty of defendant (Pcacoclc). The particsf 
predecessors in interest established an easement by reservation to protect access to what later 
became the Davis parcel, over and across the Peacock parcel. The road was thc only usable 
means of access to the Davis parcel until the Davis's constmcted another road along the south 
side of their property, also providing acccss. The Peacocks then blockcd the origjnai road, and 
Davis brought a quiet title action to establish an easement by implication across thc origind road. 
The trial court bejd that an easement by i~nplicetions existed and the Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld the ruling. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in reacling its decision first hefd that the successors in interest 
to the original grantors of property could assert casement rights by implied or prior use. T11e 
court noted: 
[W]e believe there is no equitable reason for the distinction between grantors and 
grantees in the area of implied easements by prior use. One of the requirements 
for establishing an implied easement: by prior usc is that there has  been open and 
continuous use of the easement prior to the severance of the dominant and 
servient estates. This requiremmt ensures that the buyer obf the servient property 
will have notice of the preexisting use. Consequently, it is equitable to impose an 
casement on a buyer who already Iiad notice of its existence. Tl~erefore. we hold 
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that a successor in interest to the original grm201- of the semient property can 
claim an implied easerne~~t by prior use. 
Davis, 133 Td&o at 641-42,991 P.2d at 366-365. "The court also reaffirmed that an implied 
casetnent by prior use does not require strict necessity, but rather, only reasonable necessity. The 
court noted: 
Peacock argues &at the Rwselts aIso lzad access to their residence because 
the land they owned was bordered by Idaho Street on the urest. We contends that. 
because the Russell property was not landlocked, there was always access to the 
residence acrass their own property. Therefore, usc of the disputed road was 
neither necessary, nor provided the only usable means of acccss to the residence. 
Peacock's argument would be persuasive if skict necessity wsre required for an 
in~pJied easement by prior use. Nowcvcr, as our caws have made clear, 
reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity 
required for an easement implied by necessity. See Rear fsr'and Wafer A.F.J 'n, 
125 Idaho at 725,874 P.2d 536. In Bcar Island likatev Ass 'n. cvc held that no 
implied easement by prior use or necessity had been created. Id However, in so 
holding, we stated that the cstablislment of an casement by necessity requircd an 
"even weightier showing of a great present necessity for t l~e asement," as 
cornpmcd to the reasonable necessity required for an easement by p r io~  use. Jd. 
Id, 133 Idaho at 642,992 P.2d 15 367 (emphasis added). Finally, thc court in Davis stated thal an 
casemcnt by impIication is not extinguished even if the necessity no longer exists. Xm 
discussing this issue, the court held as follows: 
While this issue l~as  not been previously addressed by our Court, it appears the 
well-established rtde is that, unlike an easement by way of necessity. an implied 
easement by prior use is not later extinguished if the easement is no longer 
reasonably necessary. 
Ths  long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone conveys 
property, they also intend to convcy whatever is required for the beneficial use 
and enjoyment of that property, and intends to rctain all that is required for the use 
and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, an easement implied by prior 
use is a true easement of a permanent duration, rather t l~a t~  a telnporary casement 
which exists only as long as the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norke~z v 
McGahan, 823 P.2d 622,63 1 (Alaska 1991); Thon~pson v ,Schtrh, 593 P.2d 1 138, 
1145 (Oregon 1979); ,Story 17. Hefiwr, 540 P.2d 562,566 (Okla. 1975). 
AcIditionally, an implied easement by prior usc is appurtenant to the land and 
therefore passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient 
estates. See Hzlghes v.  ,Sta~e, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1 958); I.C. 5 55-603 
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(stating that a transfer of real property also includes al l  caseme~~ts atfaelled to the 
P ~ ~ P E ~ Y ) .  
Applying these rules to the facts ofthis case, we agrec: with t l~e  district court. that 
because use o f  the road was resonably necessary for the beneficial uqe of thc 
Davises' propmy at t h e  tjme of severance, an implied easement by prior usc arose 
at that ttirnc, Because that implied easement is not extjnguislled by the end of the 
necessity, the easement became appurtenmt to the land and was subsequently 
trmsfcnred to the Davises at t l~e time they purcl~ased their property. 
Id, 133 Idaho a5 643,992 P.2d at 368, 
In the present case, there was unity o f  title at tl~e time of the severance of the doininsant 
and semient estate. The road was in  me by t l~c  Futzks pl.ior to the severance ancl was their sole 
access to both tlte Section 2 1 and Section 22 properties. 'It was their intent after the severance to 
continue to use the road as their access. Tlius, use o~fthe asement was reasonably necessary for 
the beneficial use of the dominant estate (Section 22 property) at the time of the severance. 
Given thesc elements, tilere was an implied easement by prior use wl-~ich is appurtenant to the 
Capstar parcel. 
8. Prescriptive Easement 
Tile law of prescriptive easements was reiterated by the Court in Aker-s i t  D.L. While 
Comt~uction, Jnc. 132 Idaho 293,303,127 P.3d 196,206 (2005), wherein the court noted: 
A party seeking to establish thc existence o f  an eascment by prescription 'must 
prove by clear and convinciiig evidence use of the subject property, which i s  
characterized as: ( I )  open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right; (4) wit11 the actual or imputed knowledge of 
the owncr of the servjent tenement (5) for the statulory period." (Gitc omitted.) 
The statutory period in question is five years. (Cites omitted.) A clairrimt may 
rely on h s  own use, or he "may rely on tbe adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant nay  combine such 
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establisl~ the requisite five 
continuous years of adverse use." (Cite omitted.). Once the claimant: presents 
proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted usc oft11e claimed right for. 
the prescriptive period, cven ~witl~out evidence of how the usc began, he raises the 
01 9 
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presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. (Cites omitted.) 
The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tene~nent o show that the 
claimmtb uusc was pemjssive, or by virtue of a Iicense, contract, or agreement. 
(Citcs omitted.) The nature of the use is adverse if "'it m s  contrary to tllc set-vient 
ocvner's claims to the property." The state of mind of the users of the alleged 
eacement is not controlling; the focus i s  on the nature of their use. 
In Cardenas v.  K~rpjuweit, 1 14 Idaho 79,&3,75"sP.2d 290,294 (1 95S),  the Supreme Court held: 
A "claim of right"' signifies use witl~or~t recognition O F  the rights of the servimt 
cslate's otvner.(Cite omitted.). The general nsle is that proof: of open, ncstoriou, 
contintzous and u k t e m p t e d  use for tlie statutory period raises the rebuttable 
presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. (Cite omitted.) 
Konetheless, as stated jn Simmons: "Tile use of a driveway UI common with t l~e  
owner and thc general public, in the absence of somc dacisive act on the user's 
part indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption 
of individual right therein in his favor. " 
Wlen the road providing access to thc Funltrs' Section 2 1 and Section 22 parcels was 
establishcd is unknown. It is known that jl: was there as early as 19GG. It is undisputed that 
F1uzks were using the road for access to both their Section 2 1 parcel a d  their Section 22 paarcel 
prior lo segregating the parcels. Wlen Funks sold thc Section 21 parcel to Human Synergistics, 
tbey included in, the sales contract langttage that gave notice that they intended to continue to usc 
the road fox ingress and egress to their retained Section 22 parcel. This language provided notice 
they were claiming a right to use: the road in the future for ingress and egress to their retained 
lands. Tt is undisputed that Funks and tl~cir predecessors then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruption, undcr a claim of right for the statutory period. Farmslnians (a 
predecessor of Lawrence) granted an express easement for ingressiegess to a portion of Section 
22 to Funks' predecessor, Mack, recognizing Mack had a right to the easement because it was 
l l ~ c  historical access to Section 22. Thus. there is &so a prescriptive easement across thrs road. 
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C. Easement by Necessity 
As1 emernent by necessity has some similar elements to an easement by prior use. T11e 
Court in B&IDe\)elopmenf d;r Jnv.. Inc. v Par,~ons. 126 Idaho 504, 887 P.2d 49 (Ct.App. 1994) 
noted: 
To establish an casement by necessity, the claimant must prove the following 
elements: (1) that the dominant parcel and the servient parcel were once part of a 
larger tract uncler common ownersl~ip; (2) that the necessity for the casement 
claimed over thc servient estate existed ul the time of the severance: and (3) the 
present ~~ecessity for the claimed easement is great. bIacC'oskifl v Ehbert, 1 12 
Idaho 1 1 15, 1.118. 739 P.2d 414,417 (Ct.App. 1987) (emphasis added). An 
easement by necessity is a creature of public policy. Bnh Daniels & Sons v 
PVeal:er, 106 Idaho 535, 543,68 1 P.2d 101 0,1018 (CtApp. 1984). Therefore, tlze 
easement does not depend on sm express mutual agreement. Rather, it aiises. and 
will be recognized, when the thrcc required elements have been establislwd. 
Establishment of an easement by necessity is not defeated by a contrary 
expectation l~arbored by one of the parttes. hducCaskil2. 1 12 Idaho at 1 1 19, 739 
P.2d at 41 8 .  It is a question of law. An o m c r  of property, however, c m o t  create 
thc necessity by his or her own actions. Cardwell v. Smith, 105 Tdaho 71, 80. 665 
P.2d 1081, 1090 (Ct.App. 1983). 
In the present case, thc domina~t parcel and the sorvient parcel were once part of a larger tract 
under common ownership. At tile time of the scvesance, the necessity for the easement across the  
Lawrence parcel existed. This necessity continues today as no otl~er method of roacI access 
exists to the parcel. Therefore, thc elements of an ascrnent by necessity exists. 
MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTTON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 13 
V. CONCLIJSTON 
For the foregoing reasons and under the foregoing legal tl~cories, the Court should gant  
Plaintiffs motion for su~nrnary judgment q ~ d i n g  title to the easernent to plaintiffs and issue a 
pcmment jn,junction prohibiting 13efendants from hrrther blocking Plaintiffs acccss. 
D A E D  this 1 4 ~ '  day of May, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON Rr. WEEKS, P.A. 
F--'. 
BY: 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
Attorneys for Plainn'ff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1 4th day of May, 2007,I causcd to be sewed a true and co~rect 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to tlic followiug: 
U. S.  Mail Overnigl~t Mail 
6 Hat~d Delivcrcd 0 Telecopy: (FAX) 
,- 3 
Coeur d' Alene, TD 838 16 
G ! !  
022 
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JOHN P. WHEMN, Q.C. 
2 1 3 M. 4" !Street 
Caeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
iSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J.  LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
VS t 
HEARING DATE; June 1 3,2007 
TIME; 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their counsel of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court, pursuant to Rules 6(b) and 56(c) and 56(0 of rhe Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for an extension of rime in which to file their opposition in response 
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants request to file their 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1 
response on or after August 1 5, 2007. The affidavits of John P. Whelan, Douglas 
Lawrence and John Mack are offered in support of this motion. Defendant's 
request oral argument. 
 his motion is made on the grounds that Defendant's have nor had the 
opportunity to discover the whereabouts of the various witnesses whose 
affidavits are relied upon by Plaintiff. Defendants intend to depose each and 
every witness who has filed an affidavit for Plaintiff. This motion is made on the 
further ground that Gapstar's counsel only yesterday advised Defendant's that it 
also scheduled a Motion for Summary Judgment for the date of June 1 3, 2007. It 
had given previous notice that only an order shortening time was to be heard. 
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to identify what documents it relies upon in 
seeking its Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, Defendant's counsel 
has had to review thousands of pages of the files pertaining to this matter in an 
effort to determine what issues must be addressed In the opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Lastly, no notice was given by Plaintiff's counsel 
that she intended to renew her Motion for Summary Judgment . 
DATED t h i s % - )  day of May. 2007. 




rney for Defendants 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of Nay, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
U 5. Mail, postage prepaid 
-/  Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COIQNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plain tiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
4 
' SE NO. CV-02-07671 
RING DATE: June 13,  2007 
TIYE: 3:00 p.m. 
I JVDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 i 1 
) ss. I I 
County of Kootenai 1 
I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly swoJd upon my oath, depose and 
say: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 1 
1 .  I make this Affidavit of my own personal dnow~edge. I am over the age of 
18, I am knowledgeable of the facts and issues r garding this matter and am 1 
competent to testify to the facts contained in this affidavit. It is true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge. 
2. In July 1 996, my wife and I entered into a k ale agreement to purchase 80 
I 
acres in the Southeast Quarter of Section 21, ~odnsh ip  50 North, Range 5 West 
I 
from Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian. We have obned this parcel of land for 
over 10 years now and have been in litigation ov 'r the use of our private road L 
for nearly 9 years, t have studied the history of th s road thoroughly and can 1 
speak with some authority on the matter. ! 
I 
3. In October of 1998, 1 called Harold Funk a the telephone. I called him to r 
I clarify my understanding of the language that wa contained in the Sales 
Agreement between the Funks and Human Synergisfics; the same language the 
I 
Plaintiff Capstar claims was a reservation of an e 4 semenr. In a follow-up letter 
I 
I 
that Harold Funk mailed to me in November 199 , Mr. Funk reassured me that 
the language was not a reservation. But rather, i t :  as merely to except, from 1 
title, an easement that was previously granted ro ~/;TE. 'arc nr~~&Z:Z:c).. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 2 
5/30/2007 I G  52 FAY 6 f i 4 2 2 4 0  John P Whelan ,  P C -? &a CIVIL U E P l  @ c i  l l r 0 2 4  $;p/% n ,&. -2 " *#>C ,tp,* e u <  # 
c t g  .'$ftw* 
4. In March of 2004, Mr. Funk gave the plaintiFf Capstar an affidavit, which 
rhe plaintiff now relies on to support a motion of summary judgment, in which 
Mr. Funk makes a direct contradiction to the signed writing I have from him. 
Contrary to his writing to me, Mr. Funk now claims in his affidavit that the 
language in the sale agreement amounts to a reservation. In light of Mr. Funk 
contradictions, I believe the Court should impeach any testimony coming from 
Mr. Funk. 
5. Also in his affidavit, Mr. Funk claims that Meilick Road d ~ d  not provide 
access to the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 or the Southeast quarter of 
Section 21. This statement is just false. My wife and I have, on several occasions 
datlng as early as 1996, driven our vehicle all the way from our p ropew in 
Section 21 to Mellick road. 
6. Also in his affidavit, Mr. Funk claims that had he not reserved an 
easement across the now Lawrence parcel, that his land in Section 22 would 
have been landlocked. Mr. Funk knows this statement to be false as well. In 
order for Mr. Funk to have a legal easement to his land in Section 22 (through 
the now Lawrence parcel), the Funks would have need an easement across the 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 3 
15;30!2007 16 52 FP,Y G642240  John P ' R h e l a n .  P C * C I V I L  DEPT  @J 0 1 2 i O 2 4  
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Northeast Quarter of Section 28. The Funks never obtained a legal access across 
parcel that precedes the Lawrence parcel traveling; from Signal Point Road and 
therefore his land is  Section 22  was landlocked irrespective of the Lawrence 
parcel. The Funks as grantors could never convey GI legal access from Signal 
Point road because they never obtained a legal access. 
7. Also in his affidavit, paragraph 9, Mr. Funk states: "At rhe time of the sale 
in 1976 to Rassmussen and ChamberlainJ access to the parcel was by use of the 
same private road that had been continuously used since we first purchased the 
propern" I take issue to this statement on this pdint. In an affidavit Harold Funk 
gave to the Koorenai Electric Cooperative in February 2001, he states "We 
(Harold & Marlene) resided in Kootenai County, fdaho from 1967 until Haro/d 
Funk moved in the fall of 1975 and Marlene Funk moved in 1976 after we sold 
our house. "Clearly, if Mr. Funk moved to American Falls in 1 975, he wasn't 
continuously using the access road across the Lawrence parcel. I think i t s  save to 
say that Mr. Funk's use of the access road probably did nor extend beyond 
1975. If he did use it past 1975, the use was infrequent at best. Certainly, it was 
nor continuous as he would have this Court believe. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 4 
029  
8, Access to my property, is  controlled by three gates. The first gate is  
located at the end of the county maintained portion of Signal Point road. The 
gate was erected in December 1995 and has been locked continuously since that 
time. Another gate is located on Wilber Mead's property and was locked from 
1966 through 1998. In 1998 Wilber Mead removed the lock at which time I 
placed a lock on my gate. My gate has been continuously locked since 1998. 
9. In 1 997 1 entered into a License Agreement with Nextel Corporation, the 
predecessor in interest to Tower Asset. Through this License Agreement, Nextel 
and their successors pay me a monthly rental fee to ingresslegress across my 
land to get to their tower site. They have continued to pay me this rental fee 
since the License began in 1997. 
10. Sometime after 1998, 1 met with Clear Channel Management (Capstar). 
They informed me that they no longer operate any equipment from their site on 
Blossom Mountain, but rather rent out the tower facility to other tenants. 
1 1 .  Sometime after my meeting with Clear Channel, I did enter into a 
License agreement with one of Clear Channel's tenants, Great Northern 
Broadcasting. This license agreement was similar to the Nextel Agreement in 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE- 5 
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that they paid me for access across my road. Great Northern Broadcasting 
honored this agreement until sometime around the time Capstar filed suit 
against us; at which rime Capstar was able to get a Temporary Restraining Order 
against us and we had to give them a key to our gate. 
DATED this 30th day of Nay, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of May, 2007 
,\ti\\'' 1 ff/ii,,, 
,\'\ \* Pa + ,' $. ..-=*. $.!* ****$$ .- *OTA/)). : s 
4 = - .  . C, S 3*:  - r l ) m 6 ,  ;*3 - .  3 -i, : 2 P ~ ~ ~ \ G  .-• 3 
%Q>-. $0 * 
/, +I".g.. . .g-p g Commission expires 
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BL-rf iLAS P. AND BRENDA J. LAWRENCE 
ILO Bsx 1027 
Thursday, Nawmkr 5, 1998 
M. m o l d  Funic 
865 F m o m  
American Falls, Idaha 832 1 1 
Refetsnce: Blossom Mountain - SE section 21 
Dear b o l d :  
I want ta thanl: you for raking the dme last week in helping mc undentand Ule language contained in rhe 
Sales Agrement between you and Human Synergistics. It is samcwhar ambiguous and your help is very 
much appmiaxad. 
I have atrached a copy ~f the Sales Agrccmenc for your review and recallustion. Unforlunatciy, the 
tepduction quality is not very good and it's hard to read. So to help the rnattcr, I have rctypad tlic 
paragraph in question (lee column) and have typed the e x p h t i o n  as I undersand it  to bc (right 
column). 
Subject lo and including an ingress e w s  u u e m c n r ,  In October 1966, W e  Rtynotds sold a 1 acre parcel to 
over *s ~ J M  adjoinkg property in sarrd sect~ons f 1 GTE in UleBW Sectjon 22. Pikc dccdcd to CTE an 
and 22 owncd by the grantor easement for ingresdegress across the SE Section 2 1 
and the SW sgtion 22 o f  which h s  property became 
subject to. 
and including an ingress cgms easement over -. In November 1972, Harold F d  purchased an 
portions of Section 2 1 hemtofore! gmted to the ingtcsslegm casement from Wilber Mead across the 
grantor Said casement shall be over &sting roads SW sectton 2 1 for the benefit of the lands owned by 
until such time as all record ownem shall agree to Harold Funk in Sections 2 1-22, and IS. This 
the reIocation, impmment and/or abmdo-nt of easement is to run with the existing roads until dl 
all or any portions of any roads. This casement is 
also over slrnilar Iands in khan 15. . 
I have reviewed this document and agree 
wich the clarification, 
Mr. Funk, if I tavo rhc coriccr wdasuurding oi tlds language, would you please sign and renun this 
document to me at your carliest convenience. Nsa, pleas  feel frec to add any Ihoughts you feel 
in this matter. A copy has been iricluded for your rccords. 
1 5 / 3 0 / 2 0 0  7 1 6 . 5 3  FP,::: 6642240 6$g*+ Jonn P .  Wneian, P C 
v2<g&% 
@3$ *4s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 0 day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
U.S. Mail, postaae prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHEUN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N . 4'h Street: 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPEWTING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
VS. 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Koote nai 1 
I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 1 
competently testify. This affidavit is filed in support of Defendants' motion for 
enlargement. 
2 ,  The Defendants have not had the opportunity to gather the 
affidavits and deposition testimony needed to oppose Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. It is  the intent of Defendants to take the deposition of each 
witness who has filed an affidavit for Plaintiffs in this action. Unfortunately, the 
witnesses are scattered across the United States and Defendants have not been 
able to track down each witness, much less take their depositions. So additional 
time is needed to oppose the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. I would 
estimate that an additional sixty (60) days from the date scheduled for the 
motions Oune 1 3, 2007) would be sufficient. 
3.  The motion for enlargement on behalf of Defendants i s  made on the 
additional ground that, in the case of Capstar, Plaintiff only noticed-up i ts  
Motion for Summary Judgment yesterday, as it had previously scheduled only a 
motion shortening time for June 13, 2007. Additionally, the Plaintiff has failed 
to last or articulate which part of the Court records is  being relied upon for the 
facts in support of i t s  motion. I am therefore forced to search through 
thousands of pages of my files pertaining to this matter to determine what 
issues must be addressed. Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel did not give any 
advance notice of her intent to pursue two separate motions for summary 
judgment. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHElAN - 2 
DATED this day of May, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C 
30 Subscribed and sworn before me this day of Nay, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Cocur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Nail, postage prepaid 
J ~ a c s i r n i l e :  (208) 664-1 684 
SUSa4N P. W E K S  
JAMES, VEWON & W E K S ,  P.A. 
18'75 N. Lakewood Dr, Stc. 200 
Coeus d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
TSB SS5.255 
PAGE 04/14 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THJ2 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF I(OOTENA1: 
CAPSTAR RAX)fO OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 1 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA 3. 
LAVIFZNCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
IA WRENCE FILED 513 0/07 
NOTICE OF HEAR.INC: 
June 13,2007 ,-$ 
Time: 3:00 p.m. YL- 
Judge: J o h  T. Mitchell 
C O m S  NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to RUIe 56 (e) and Rule 7 (b)(J)(B), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby moves to strike portions of l i ~ e  agidasit of Douglas Lawrence for the 
reasons enumerated herein.. Regarding affrdavitx submitted in support o-f summary judgment, 
Pasey v. Ford Motor Credit CO., 1 1 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement 
that evidence submitted by afidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein 
the court noted: 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 1 
JVM PAGE 05/14 
Posey argues that nearly the entire aadavit is inadmissible because it does not 
show that the matters averred to are based on personal knowledge, contains 
conclusory assertions, contains inadmissible hearsay and provides no foundation 
for introduction of attached exhibits. Posey's position is well taken. 
AfTidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made on 
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testifj. to the matters 
stated. Jdaho Rule of.' Civil Procedure 56(e). These req~~irements "are not satisfied 
by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by 
pmonal knowledge. " (Cites omitted .) 
The Posey v. Ford iMotar Credit Co. court further noted: 
Eight documents are attached to the affidavit. No fo~mdation is provided 
concenling who prepared the documents, several of which, on their face, indicate 
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Caldwell dealership. The affidavit 
purports to jdentify the documents without demonstration of the requisite personal 
lcnowledge for authentication of  the docurncnts pursuant to I.R.E. 901 and 
includes arguments as to the documents' legal effect, nonc of wlGcli is admissible. 
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are offered to show the tn~th of 
assertions contained within them, the documents are hearsay for which no hearsay 
rule exception has been established by the Griffjth affidavit. In State v. HiN, 140 
Idaho 625,97 P.3d 101 4 (Ct.App. 2004), we described the foundational 
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule far 
business records: 
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay 
rule, allows admission of a rccord or report if it was made 
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity md  if it was thc regular practice of that business to 
make the report or record. See I-leenderson v. ,%nifh, 128 
Iclaho 444.450: 915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996); h fT?e Interest of 
S. K ,  127 Idaho 513,520.903 P.2d 102, 109 (Ct.App. 
1995). Tllese foundational rcquirements must be shown 
tlirough "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness." I.R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be 
authenticated by someone "wl~o has custody of the record 
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision 
of its creation." f~eplderson, 128 Jdaho at 450,915 P.2d at 
12. A document is not admissible under I.R.E. 803(6) 
unless the person testifying has a personal knowledge of 
the record-keeping system used by the business which 
created the document. Jd.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 
293,297,900 P.2d 201,205 (Ct.hpp. 1995). 
TvIOTION TO STRIKE: 2 
abi M b /  L@@ t L b :  55 2U85b41684 
Ifill,  140 Idaho at 628, 97 P.3d at 1017. The mere rcceipt and 
retention by a business entity of a documen% that was created 
elsew11sre does not transform the document into a business record 
of the receiving entity for purposes of 1.R.E. 803(6). Id.; In 
the Interest ofS K, 127 Idaho 513,520,903 P.2d 100? 109 
(Gt.App. 1995). GriEth's &davit does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records 
attached to his affidavit. 
The following portions of Mr. Lawrence's asdavit should be stricken: 
1. Paragraph 3 of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit contains inadmissible heassay and should 
2.  Paxagrapl~ G presents argument, and should be stricken. 
3. Paragraph 7 prcscnts argument and should be stricken. 
4. Paragraph 8 contains inadmissible hearsay and should he stricken. 
DATED this 6' day of June, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY: 
Attorneys for Plai,ntiff 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 3 
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CERTXNCATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby ce~tify that on the 6 ' day of ,&& 2007. I caused to be served a huc and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by lfic metl~od indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
U.S. Nail Ovemiht Mail 
Q Hand Delivered % d Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
2 1 3 4 ~ '  Street 
Cocur d' Alene, ID 83 8 1 6 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 4 
SUSAN P, WEEKS 
J M E S ,  VEWON gt WEEKS. P.A. 
1875 N. Ldewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Coew d'Alene, ID 83824 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1684 
ISB #4255 
Aaorneys for Plaintiff 
TN THE DISTRTCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TFE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANI) FOR TFE COUNW OF KOOTESAI, 
DOUGLAS LAWREiNCE and BRENDA J, 
LAWmNCE, l~usband and wife, 
GAPSTAR W I o  OPERATING COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
REPLY M I E h l l O W U M  IhT 
SUPPORT OF R E N E m D  
MOTION FOR SmWmY 
.lUDGMENT 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
Defendants. 1 
Defendant has submitted the -davit of Douglas Lawrence, apparently in opposition of 
the motion. Much o.f the affidavit i s  inadmissible. Some of it presents argument. To the extent 
this affidavit presents argument, it is addressed herein. 
Mr. Lawrence apparently requests that this court not give credence to Harold Furik's 
affidavit because of a letter that Defendants obtained from Mr. Funk in 1998 wherein he 
indicated his utlderstandix~g of the terms includcd in the Sales Agreement. Mr. Lawrence claims 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION F MARY JUDGMENT: 1 
J V W  PAGE 82/14 
that th js  letter, prepared by him, is so diametrically opposed to Harold Funk's affidavit that thc 
court should not consider Harold Funk's testimony as credible. The "clarification" portion 
followed a phone co~lversation between Mr. F d c  and Mr. Lawrence, and without all of the 
smounding circumstances ulthat conversation, it is impossible to undastarid what Mr. Funlc 
was claxifying for Mr. Lawrence with respect to the language. hllr. Lawrence h a  k n o w  how to 
contact Mr. Funk since 1998. (In fact, plaintiff's counsel was able to locate Mr. Funk based 
upon the address provided by this letter.) If he wished to have testimony regarding this issues, 
he could easily have contacted Mr. Funk. The letter he provides is hearsay, and does not provide 
impeachment of Mr. Funk's affidavit testimony. Furtl~er, hdr. Funk's affidavit testimony i s  
corroborated by Mx.Rook's aeclavit testimony. 
Nest, Mr. Lawrence argues that previous affidavits of Funk submitted in u ~ ~ n m e d  cases 
are inconsistent. I-lowever, even if one were to believe the unsupported allegations, thc aEdavits 
are not inconsistent. Mr. Funk indicated he sold We property in 1976 and that the same prive 
road that had been continuously used from when they purchased the property was the one in use 
at that time. In the "other" alleged affidavit, Mr. Funk testified that his family moved to Idaho 
Falls in 1975- 1976. Lawrence argues that if Mr. Funk moved from t l ~ e  arca in 1975, l ~ s  u c of 
the road the last year had to be infiequcnt at best. This argument inisconstrues the a ~ d a v i t  
testimony. Mr. Funk did not testify that lie used the road continuously only in 1976. He said the 
road that was the access was the one 11e had continuotisly used since he first the property, i.e. the 
only road he used, and it was on an ongoing basis. Lawrence confuses "continuous" with 
"frequent. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM Dl SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTIO& F ~ ~ ~ M A R Y  ILIDGMENT: 2 
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Defendmts have submitted no material fact in dispute. Summary judgment is 
DATED th is tjth day of June, 2007. 
JAlvES, E R N O N  & WEKS,  P.A. 
BY: 
Aeomeys for Plaintiff 
CERTImCATE OF SERVICE 
. .& 
I hereby certify that on the 6 - d a y  of j p e  2007,I caused to be semcd a true and correct 
copy of the fore oing document by tbe method indicated below, and addtcsscd to t.he mfoUowing: 
/ U.S. Mail C7 Overnigllt Mail 
C1 Hand Delivered d Tslecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 4"' Street 
Cocur d' Alene, ID 83 8 1 6 
044 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY XJDGmNT: 3 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & P.A. 
1 875 N. Lakewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur d'hlenc, ID 83 8 1 4 
Telepl-one: (203) 667-06 8 5 
Facsim.ile: (208) 664-7 684 
TSB M255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING CONPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LltWRENCE and BRENDA .T. 
LA'CVRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 02-7671 
MOTION TO STRI.Kl2 PORTIONS 
OF AFFJDA'VTT OF JOHN MACK 
FILED 5/33/07 
NOTICE OF HEARING: 
June 13,2007 
Time: 330 p.m. 
COMES NOW P1ainti.R and pursuant to Rule 56 (e)  and Rule 7 @)(3)(B), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby moves to strike portions of the &davit of John Mack for the reasons 
enumerated herein. Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgmelzt, Posey v. 
Ford Motor C~aedir Co., 11 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the rsquirement that 
evidence submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the 
court noted: 
Posey argues that nearly the entire &davit is inadmissible because it does not 
show that the matters averred to are based on personal knowledge, contains 
MOTION TO STNICE: 1 
conclusory assertions, contains inadmissible 11arsay and provides no Foundation 
for introduclion of attached exhibits. Posey's position is well taken. 
~aidavj t s  uppoding or opposing a summary judment motion must be made on 
personal hourledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissi'crlc in evidence, 
and must slsow &matively t l ~ t  the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stared. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 561~). These requirements "are not satisfied 
by an that i s  cnnclusory, based on hearsay, and not supponed by 
pmonal knowledge." (Cites omittcd.) 
The Posey v,  Ford Motor Crediir C;3, court further noted: 
Eight documents are attached to affidavit. S o  foundation is provided 
conccrning who prepared the docuinats, several of which, an their face, indicate 
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Caldwell dcalcrship, The affidavit 
purports to identifjr the documents without demonstration of tl-ie requisite personal 
knowledge for authentication of the documents pursuant to I.R.E. 901 and 
includes arguments as  to the documents' legal effect, none of which is admissible. 
(Cite omitted.) To thc extent that the documents are offered to show the truth of 
assertions contained within them. the documents axe hearsay for which no hearsay 
rulc exception has been established by the GriEth afidavj t. In Sfate v HZ'EI, 140 
I d a h  625,97 P.3d 10 14 (Ct.App. 2004), we described the foundational 
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the l-iearsay nile for 
business records: 
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay 
rule, allows admission ofa  record or report if it was made 
and kept in the c o m e  of a regularly cond~~cted business 
activity and if it was thc: regular practice of that busiaess to 
make the report or record. See He~derson v. Smith, 128 
Tdahrt 444,450,915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996); In the Interest of 
S.W., 127 Idaho 513,520,903 P.2d 102, I09 (Ct.App. 
1995). These foundational req~~irements must be: shown 
tluough "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness." I.R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be 
authenticated by someone "who has custody of tlie record 
as a regular part of his or h a  work or who has supervision 
of i ts  creation." Hendersnn, 128 Idaho at 450,915 P.2d at 
12. A document is not admissible under I.R.E. 803(6) 
unless the person testifying has a personal laowledge of 
the record-keeping system used by the business which 
creatcd the document. Id.; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 1dLzl.10 
293,297,900 P.2d 201,205 (Ct.App. 1995). 
HiN. 140 Jdaho at 628,97 P.3d at 101 7. The mere receipt a ~ d  
rctcntion by a business entity of a document that was created 
elsewhere does not txansfoim the document into a business record 
PAGE 02IC34 
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of the, receiving entity for purposes af  T.R.E. 803(6). Id.; In 
Iha Interest of$. W ,  127 Iddm 5 13, 520, 903 P.2d 102, 109 
(Gt.App. 1995). Chifith's affidavit does not comply with the 
req~~irements of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records 
aaacl~ed trr his af5daGt. 
Mr. Mack indicates jn his a%&vit that l ~ e  has owned his property since 1992 and has 
used and improved a priva* access road from the termination of Mellick Road into the Section 
22 property he owns, which sunoun,ds the Plait~tiFs property. Mr. Mack claims that he "takes 
issuc" with. Harold Funk's ai3davit testimony because in 1969 Mellick Road extended to 
property owncd by Mr. Funk in Section 15. ;LIT. Mack postulates without foundation or evidence 
to support his supposition that Mr. Funk's property collnected the private access road that he now 
uses to access his property in Section 22. Therefore, that portion of John Mack's testimony 
should be stricken and not considered for the motion for enlargement. Further, if it was 
Defendants7 intent to present th is evidence as raising a question of fact in opposition to the 
motion for s~wlm.ary judgment, it should be stricken and not considered. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & REEKS, P.A. 
BY: 
Attorneys for Pjaintiff 
MOTION TO STRIKE: 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hcreby certify that on t h ~  7'" day of h e ,  2007, I caused to be served a m e  and correct 
copy of thc foregoing document by d1c method indicated below, and addrcssed to the following: 
U.S. Mail Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered d Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelm 
2 1.3 dth Street 
Coeur d'Alme, ID 83 8 16 
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 
lSE# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO, CV-02-7671 
NOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
" L  
HEARING DATE: June 13,  2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against the Honorable John T. 
Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-entitled action. This motion i s  made on 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 1 




the ground that Defendanrs believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased or 
prejudiced against them or their case in this action. This motion is made on the 
ground of ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 40(d)(2). 
Defendants request oral argument. 
DATED this ay of June, 2007. 
Respectfully Su brnitted, 
JW Whelan 
Attorney for Defendants 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the in$,, ofJune, 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: .S, Nail, postage prepaid 
dacrirnile: (208) 664-1 684 - 
)6)0512007 1 6 . 4 8  F A X  6642240 John P Whelan,  P C .  &&;IVLL D E P I .  
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FILE? 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4'"treet 
Coeur d'AAlene, 10 13381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208)  664-2240 
lSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O U N N  OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporarlon, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P, LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAWRENCE, husband and w~fe, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER 1 SHORTENING TIME 
HEARING DATE: June 13, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mirchell 
COMES NOW, t h e  attorney for the above-named Defendants, John F. 
Whelan, and respectfully mover the Court for an order that the time required for 
service of the Motion for Disqualification for Cause be shortened so that this 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 1 
matter can be heard on the 13th day of June, 2007, at 3:00 o'clock p.m., before 
the Honorable John T, Mitchell. 
This Motion is  made for the reason and upon the grounds that there is not: 
sufficient. time to give statutory notice- Plaintiff will not be disadvantaged in any 
fashion, and further, it would be in the interest of justice. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that John P, Whelan will present oral argument and 
evidence at this hearing, 
DATED this $&day of June. Z O O l .  
Respecdu lly Submitted, 
Atrorney for Defendanrs 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the of June, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to  the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon 81 Weeks 
Attorneys at law 
1875 N. Cakewoad Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.5, Mail, postage prepaid 
/facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
21 3 N, Gth Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
1SB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plainriff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
HEARING DATE: June 13,  2007 
TINE: 3;00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
> ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
1, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 1 
1 .  I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence;. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
competently testify. 
2. This affidavit i s  ofTered in support of the Motion for Disqualification 
for Cause seeking to disqualify the Honorable John T. Mitchell from presiding 
any further in the above-entitled action, and also in support of Defendants' 
application for an order shortening time. 
3.  When the Honorable John T, Mitchell took the bench in 2001, your 
affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in the case of Yovichin V. 
Bush, CV-2001-2116 (2001). Judge Mitchell took over the role as presiding 
Judge in that case for the Honorable James Judd when Judge Judd retired, Your 
affiant believes that Judge Mitchell disqualified himself, pursuant to Rule 
40(df(4), in that case on November 20, 2001 because your affiant was the 
attorney of record for the Defendants and Judge Mitchell was biased or prejudice 
against John P. Whelan at that rime, as the parties to the action and the counsel 
for the Plaintiffs (Jerry Trunkenholz) had had no prior dealings with Judge 
Mitchell before he was assigned to the case. Your affiant believes that Judge 
Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case because he had a "personality 
conflict" with your affiant that biased or prejudiced Judge Mitchell in his 
handling of that case. A copy of the order of disqualification is  attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
4. In the case of Sau/s v. Luchi (CV-04-1616), your affiant was the 
counsel for rhe Defendant, The matter was tried as a Jury trial. The jury 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 2 
rendered a defense verdict in that chase which the Honorable John T, Mitchell 
overturned in part. The portion of the verdict overturned required your affhnt's 
client to pay over an earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs even though their 
pleadings made no such request. Your affiant believes that the Courr's action 
was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the attorney for the 
Defendant in the action. The Defendant filed his own appeal in that action, the 
status of which i s  unknown, 
5. In the case of Straub v. Smith, CV-04-5437, your affiant was the 
arrorney for the Defendants, In that case, the Plaintiff dismissed her action one 
week before a scheduled jury trial. The attorney for the Plaintiff, Scott Poorman, 
sought and received your affiant's stipularion to have the case dismissed. Your 
affiant reached no agreement with Mr. Poorman to waive costs and attorney 
fees, Yet, the order submitted to the Honorable John T. Mitchell by Mr. Poorman 
contained wording that the parties were to bear their own costs, The proposed 
order was not sent to your affiant before being submitted to the Court for 
signing. The Court signed the order as submitted. When the order was served 
on your affiant after it had been signed, your affiant filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration. The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the 
motion. The motion was denied- The grounds for denial included the failure to 
c i te  a rule of procedure in support of the motion (yet such a rule was referenced 
in the motion). The claim for costs and attorney fees was denied on the 
additional ground that the Defendants' pleading did not contain a request for 
attorney fees (which I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(4) specifically states i s  not necessary). 
This ground for deniai of the motion for reconsideration was not even asserted 
by Mr. Poorman in his opposition papers to the motion. The Court supplied Mr. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 




Poorman with his argument. Attorney fees and costs were denied to  your affiant 
and his clients even though the Court admonished Mr. Poorman for perpetrating 
a fraud on the Court. An appeal was filed by your affiant for the Defendants 
and the Court of Appeal overturned the trial court3 ruling on the matter. The 
ldaho Supreme Court took the case on review but no decision has been issued 
on the review, Your affiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Straub v. Smith 
case was motivated by the Court's bias and prejudice against your affiant. 
6. In the case of Capstar v. Lawfence, CV-02-7671, the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, who was 
Susan Seeks, the partner of Lee James, a friend of the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
and the current president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association. In this case, 
the Court found that a certain Sale Agreement pertaining to the sale of land was 
clear and unambiguous, An appeal was taken by the Defendants. The ldaho 
Supreme Court overturned the grant of summary judgment. Your affiant 
believes that the result on the appeal has merely increased the bias and 
prejudice of the Court against your affiant. 
7. In thecaseof  TowerAssetSub,lnc. v.Lawrence(CV-03-4621),on 
the same set of documents found to be clear and uinambiguous in the Capstar 
case, the Court found the documents ambiguous. The Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff in that action, Your affiant believes that the 
granting of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff (who was represented by 
Ms. Weeks) was motivated by bias and prejudice against your affiant, An appeal 
was taken to the ldaho Supreme Court and the Court's order was overturned. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEIAN - 4 
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Yaur affiant believes that the results of the appeal in the case has only increased 
the COUR'S bias and prejudice against your affiant. 
8, In the recent cases of Krivor v, R~gers (CV-06-6252) and 
Metropolitan Propem dG Casualty v. A//en (CV-06-6358), where your affiant 
represents the Rogers and the Allens, Defendants in the actions, the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court will not entertain 
argument from your affiant unless the argument is  suppoPted by cases directly 
on point. Your affiant believes the Court has singled out your affiant for 
treatment that is  different from the treatment received by other attorneys 
appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell. 
9, Your affiant believes that the bias and prejudice held by the Court 
against your affiant results in a situation where your affiant's clients do not 
receive fair and impartial rulings by the Court. Your affiant believes that the 
bias and prejudice held by the Court against your affiant causes the Coun to be 
biased and prejudiced against the clients of your affiant. 
10. Your affiant requests that the Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualify 
himself from further rulings on the above-entitled matter. 
11, Good cause for the granting of Defendants' application for an order 
shortening time exists in that the date of June 13, 2007 has already been 
resewed for the hearing of several motions. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAM - 5 
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DATED this ay of June, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
~tte for Defendants 
7l-l 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 5 day of June, 2007. 
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Residing at: %A 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ay of June, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Nail, postage prepaid 
- Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
IN 'THE: DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D1ST;RICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE GOUBTY OF ICOOTERA~ 
L' s 
ROBERT BUSH, 
The undet-signed hav1n.g deremined char i t  is approptjart ro voluntarily disqual~f j l  htmscif 
1T IS ORDLREXl that rhc ~mdcrsigned is hereby disqualified and rllis marrer is referred :o 
rhc administraiive judge for re-assqgnmcnr. , 
1 h a c b y  ccniiy r R u ~  011 i!le , 2 / dny of Novrmber 2001 i true 2nd concct copy or ihc 
forcgoriig r ; t s  n i a ~ l c d ,  posrspc prcplrd, or rolcr B y  inraofficc mati or facsimile to: 
Hon Charles l~losbclc 
ORDER OF SELF o l s C Z u A ~ l F l C ~ ~ l 0 ~  
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, I CASE NO, CV-02-7671 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAVIIIRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants, I 
ORDER SHORTENINC TINE 
BASED upon the Motion for Disqualification for Cause and Application for 
Order Shortening Time filed herein and for good cause appearing, now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that John P. Whelan's Motion for Disqualification 
for Cause Application for Order Shortening Time shall be heard on the 13th 
day of June, 2007 at 3:00 p.m. 
ORDER SHORTENINC TIME - 1 
DATED this \*day of June, 2007. 
J n . Mitchell, District Judge v 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 2 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15, day of June, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed as indicated below: 
John P, Whelan 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via; U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Fax ro (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, I D  8381 4 
Via: 0.5. Nail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
S LOFIDAHO 1 
County of KOOTENAI )" 
FILED 
0'&k d-, M 
ERK OF DISTRI COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware ) 
Corporation, case NO. CV 2003 4621 
Plaintiffs, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
1 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
VS. 
) 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE, 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
) 
Defendants. 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 




DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
) 
Defendants. 
case NO. CV 2002 7671 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE, 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) 
I. BACKGROUND. 
A. Tower Asset, Inc. v. Lawrence. 
On June 27, 2003, plaintiff Tower Asset, Inc. filed this lawsuit against defendants 
Lawrence, requesting an easement across defendants Lawrences' land so that Tower 
Asset could service antennas on land it leased on top of Blossom Mountain. Tower Asset 
requested a temporary restraining order which was granted on June 24, 2003, ordering 
Lawrences not to block Tower Asset's access across Blossom Mountain Road, 066 
contingent on Tower Asset posting a $3,000.00 bond. Douglas Lawrence filed a pro se 
appearance on December 5,2003, and Brenda Lawrence filed a pro se appearance on 
December I 8, 2003. 
On August 17, 2004, Tower Asset filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
September 9, 2004, attorney John P, Whelan appeared as counsel for the Lawrences. 
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion was held November 9, 2004. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the Court granted Tower Asset's motion and ordered Tower 
Asset's counsel to prepare an order. Tower Asset did not prepare a proposed order for 
quite some time, but on May 27, 2005, this Court entered an "Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title." On July 7, 2005, Lawrences 
timely filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court filed its 
decision vacating summary judgment and remanding the matter back to this Court. On 
April 18, 2007, the Remittitur from the ldaho Supreme Court was filed in this case. Two 
days later, on April 20, 2007, this Court noticed this matter for a status conference to be 
held on May 14, 2007. Counsel for both sides appeared, and at the conclusion of that 
hearing, this matter was set for a four day jury trial commencing December 10, 2007. 
That jury trial was given a first priority setting relative to the Capstar case. Also on May 
14, 2007, Tower Asset filed its "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", and this was 
discussed at the May 14, 2007, status conference. At that May 14, 2007, hearing, Tower 
Asset requested a hearing date for their motion for summary judgment and was given the 
date of June 13, 2007. 
On June 5,2007, John P. Whelan, attorney for defendants Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence, filed a "Motion for Disqualification for Cause", an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan" 
in support of said motion, and a Notice of Hearing on said motion for June 13, 2007. 
Since such hearing date did not give plaintiff the required fourteen-day notice (I.R.C.P. 1) 6 7 
7(b)(3)fA)) , an Application for Order Shortening Time was filed. At the June 13, 2007 
hearing, the motion to shorten time was granted. 
B. Capsfar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 
On November 7, 2002, plaintiff Capstar Radio Operating Company filed this 
lawsuit against defendants Lawrence, requesting an easement across defendants 
Lawrences' land so that Capstar could access the land it owns on top of Blossom 
Mountain, upon which it has a transmission tower. Capstar requested a temporary 
restraining order which was granted on November 7, 2002, ordering Lawrences not to 
block Capstar's access across Blossom Mountain Road, contingent on Capstar posting a 
$1,000.00 bond. A hearing was held on November 15, 2002, on the preliminary 
injunction, and Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence appeared pro se. The 
preliminary injunction order was entered on November 21,2002. On December 2,2002, 
attorney Ian Smith appeared on behalf of Lawrences. On August 26, 2003, Smith filed 
his motion to withdraw which was rendered moot by the substitution of attorney Sam 
Eisemann filed on September 5,2003. Even though he is not an attorney, on November 
3, 2003, Douglas Lawrence filed a Notice of Substitution of Counsel for both himself and 
Brenda Lawrence. On December 5, 2003, Douglas Lawrence filed a notice appearance 
that he is appearing on behalf of himself only. At a hearing December 11, 2003. Douglas 
Lawrence appeared, as did Brenda Lawrence. The Court cautioned the Lawrences of the 
hazards of appearing without counsel, that they would be held to the same standard as 
an attorney, that Douglas Lawrence could not represent Brenda Lawrence, and required 
Brenda Lawrence file a written pro se appearance if she was going to represent herself. 
Mediation was ordered to be completed no later than February 28, 2004. Brenda 
Lawrence filed her appearance on December 18,2003. 
On March 9, 2004, Capstar filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and noticed 
that motion for hearing on April 6, 2004, and on March 31, 2004, Capstar noticed that 
mot~on for hearing on April 14, 2004. Lawrences appeared pro se at the April 14, 2004, 
hear~ng Partial summary judgment was granted in favor of Capstar against Lawrences 
on Capstar's express easement theory, and the Court specifically stated Capstar's other 
theories were not to be considered until Lawrences completed their discovery. On April 
16, 2004, Capstar filed its Motion for Order of Entry of Final Judgment on the grounds 
that since the Court had found an express easement, the other theories were moot. On 
April 22, 2004, the Lawrences pro se filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 
Partial Summary Judgment of April 14, 2004, and noticed that matter for hearing on April 
29, 2004. Capstar noticed its Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on April 29, 2004, as 
well. At the conclusion of that hearing, this Court granted Capstar's Motion for Entry of 
Final Judgment, denied Lawrences' Motion for Reconsideration, and counsel for Capstar 
was ordered to prepare an order reflecting those rulings. Capstar's counsel failed to do 
so. The case was inactive for quite some time, and as a result, the Court filed a Notice of 
Proposed Dismissal on January 24,2005. On February 10,2005, attorney John P. 
Whelan appeared for the Lawrences. An Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Entering Decree of Quiet Title was finally prepared by Capstar's counsel and was 
signed and entered by the Court on June 7, 2005. On July 7, 2005, on behalf of the 
Lawrences, Whelan filed a Notice of Appeal. 
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court filed its decision vacating 
summary judgment and remanding the matter back to this Court. On March 30, 2007, the 
Remittitur from the ldaho Supreme Court was filed in this case. On April 20, 2007, this 
Court noticed this matter for a status conference to be held on May 14, 2007. Counsel for 
both sides appeared, and at the conclusion of that hearing this matter was set for a four- 
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day court trial commencing December 10, 2007, set with a second priority to the Tower 
Assel case. Also on May 14, 2007, Tower Asset filed its "Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment", and this was discussed at the May 14, 2007, status conference. At that May 
14, 2007 hearing, Tower Asset requested a hearing date for their motion for summary 
judgment and was given the date of June 13, 2007. 
On June 5, 2007, John P. Whelan, attorney for defendants Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence, filed a "Motion for Disqualification for Cause", an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan" 
in support of said motion, and a Notice of Hearing on said motion for June 13, 2007 
Since such hearing date did not give plaintiff the required fourteen-day notice (I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3)(A)), an Application for Order Shortening Time was filed. At the June 13, 2007 
hearing, the motion to shorten time was granted. 
11. ANALYSIS. 
A. Introduction. 
The filing of Lawrences' Motion for Disqualification for Cause has the effect of pre- 
empting the June 13, 2007, hearing on Tower Asset's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. That is because "Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding 
judge shall be without authority to act further in such action except to grant or deny such 
motion for disqualification." I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5). 
ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(2) requires the "...judge...sought to be 
disqualified shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in 
the manner prescribed by these rules for motions." Hearing was held on June 13, 2007. 
This Court appreciates the fact that this is a matter committed to the Court's discretion. 
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 29-30, 81 3 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Ct.App. 1991); 
Roselle v. Heirs and Devisees of Archie Grover, 117 ldaho 530, 533, 789 P.2d 526, 529 
(Ct.App. 1990). 
6.  Allegations of Bias and Prejudice Based Upon Past Decisions. 070 
The basis of Whelan's motion is stated in paragraph nine of his affidavit: 
9. Your affiant believes that the bias and prejudice held by the Court 
against your affiant results in a situation where your affiant's clients do not 
receive fair and impartial rulings by the Court. Your affiant believes that the 
bias and prejudice held by the Court against your affiant causes the Court 
to be biased and prejudiced against the clients of your affiant. 
Agidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, fi 9. A review of Whelan's affidavit shows he has made 
specific allegations of "bias and prejudice" by this Court against Whelan, and those 
concerns must be addressed 
From a temporal standpoint, Mr. Whelan's first concern is stated as follows: 
3. When the Honorable John T. Mitchell took the bench in 2001, 
your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, CV-2001-2116 (2001). Judge Mitchell took over the role 
as presiding judge in that case for the Honorable James Judd when Judge 
Judd retired. Your affiant believes that judge Mitchell disqualified himself, 
pursuant to Rule 40(d)(4), in that case on November 20, 2001 because your 
affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendants and judge Mitchell was 
biased or prejudice [sic] against John P. Whelan at that time, as the parties 
to the action and the counsel for the Plaintiffs (Jerry Trunkenholz [sic]) had 
had no prior dealings with judge Mitchell before he was assigned to the 
case. Your affiant believes that judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified 
himself in the case because he had a "personality conflict" with your affiant 
that biased or prejudiced judge Mitchell in his handling of that case. A copy 
of the order for disqualification is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
This Court has reviewed Exhibit A, the Order on Self Disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush. 
From a review of that document, the Court has absolutely no independent recollection as 1 
to why the Court voluntarily disqualified himself from Yovichin v. Bush, Kootenai County i 
Case No. CV 2001 21 16. The Order on Self Disqualification was entered November 20, i I 
1 2001, which was the first day of work for the undersigned as a district judge. The court 
file in Yovichin has been purged. The Court has reviewed what was scanned into court 
records in that case. Following that review, the Court cannot determine the reason for the 
disqualification and can only speculate as to two possible reasons. 
First, in Yovichh, John Beutler and Associates. Inc., and Rafael (Rusty) Reyes 0 7 1 
were eventually brought in as third party defendants by defendant Bush. However, from a 
review of the limited court records it appears that this did not occur until after November 
20, 2001. The undersigned would consider Mr. Reyes and Mr. Beutler as friends and 
would likely not have felt comfortable being assigned to a case where they were parties or 
potential witnesses. Since the scanned file is incomplete, it is not clear is whether the 
Court's review of the file on November 20, 2001, would have disclosed that John Beutler 
or Rusty Reyes were involved in the case. 
The second and more likely reason the undersigned disqualified himself in 
Yovichin is as follows: As an attorney, the undersigned can recall being involved in only 
one lawsuit where Mr. Whelan was the opposing attorney. That case was In the Matter of 
the Estate of Dianne Rothe, Kootenai County Case No. SP 675. That case involved a 
probate filed by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his client Alvin V. "Butch" Rothe. A review of the 
court file in that case shows that at the time the undersigned was transitioning from an 
attorney to a judge, he was still counsel for the ldaho Trial Lawyer's Association, which 
had been named as a recipient of a foundation named after the decedent's predeceased 
husband, to be funded from a medical malpractice claim that allegedly resulted in his 
death. The undersigned became involved in that case on March 22, 2000, and remained 
involved until just before his investiture as a district judge. On November 16, 2001, four 
days before becoming district judge, the undersigned signed a Notice of Substitution of 
Counsel where Leander L. James was substituted as counsel for the ldaho Trial Lawyer's 
Association. Since In the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe was still pending at the 
time of the undersigned's appointment as a district judge, the undersigned would have 
disqualified himself from Yovichin as a matter of course. Upon inheriting Judge Judd's 
caseload on November 20, 2001, the undersigned disqualified himself from those cases 0 7 3 
assigned to Judge Judd in which counsel on those cases were the opposing counsel in 
cases in which the undersigned was involved as an adversarial opponent at the time of 
the undersigned's appointment. Self disqualifications in those cases were made to avoid 
any appearance of bias since just prior to November 21, 2001, the undersigned and one 
of the counsel in those cases assigned to the undersigned judge were in an adversarial 
relationship. Those self-disqualifications were only made to cases in which counsel were 
involved who were opposing adversarial counsel in other cases that were stillpending 
which the undersigned was an attorney at the time he became district judge. Those self- 
disqualifications were made in several cases in an effort to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety that would occur when one day the undersigned was your adversarial 
opponent in a litigated case, and the next day he was assigned to be the judge in another 
one of your cases. The passage of time ameliorated that concern. 
Again, since the undersigned has no independent recollection as to why he 
disqualified himself in Yovichin, all of the above amounts to conjecture. Mr. Whelan has 
not stated any reason why he feels this Court would have had a 'personality conflict" with 
Mr. Whelan back on November 21, 2001, so this Court can only speculate. The only 
reason this Court engages in such speculation is because Mr. Whelan has raised 
concerns and those concerns must be addressed. The undersigned cannot recall why he 
disqualified himself in Yovichin v. Bush. In spite of the Court's best efforts to determine 
the reason for the 2001 disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush, the fact that the Court cannot 
recall the reason itself indicates a lack of bias or prejudice Had bias or prejudice or a 
"personality conflict" been the reason for that disqualification in 2001, the Court would 
expect to remember that. It does not. 
The undersigned can unequivocally state that he harbors no grudges against Mr. 0 7 3 
Whelan at the present, nor did he on November 21, 2001. The undersigned can 
unequivocally state that he has no bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan at present, nor 
did he on November 21. 2001 
If the reason for that self-disqualification in Yovichin v. Bush was due to the still 
pending probate or trust litigation, the passage of time eliminates the need to self- 
disqualify or disqualify for cause due to past adversarial relationships. Within the 
passage of a year, the undersigned did not disqualify himself from new cases assigned to 
him, in which counsel were involved which were involved in litigation still pending at the 
time he became a district judge. That fact is borne out by the fact that apparently the next 
time a case in which Mr. Whelan was involved was assigned to the undersigned was in 
2004 in Sauls v, Luchi, Kootenai County Case No. CV 2004 1616. That case was filed 
March 8, 2004, twenty eight months after the undersigned was appointed as a district 
judge, and at least twenty-eight months distant from any prior dealings with Mr. Whelan 
as an adversary. Accordingly, there was no self-disqualification in Sauls v. Luchi. 
Mr. Whelan's next concern is as follows: 
4. In the case of Sauls v. Luchi (CV-04-1616), your affiant was the counsel 
for the Defendant. The matter was tried as a jury trial. The jury rendered a 
defense verdict in that chase [sic] which the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
overturned in part. The portion of the verdict overturned required your 
affiant's client to pay over an earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs even 
though their pleadings made no such request. Your affiant believes that the 
Court's action was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the 
attorney for the Defendant in the action. The Defendant filed his own 
appeal in that action, the status of which is unknown. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp. 2-3, 7 4. This Court's action in that case was simply not 
in any way "motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant as the attorney for the 
Defendant in the action." Mr. Whelan is correct; Mr. Luchi filed his own appeal. A review 
of the Court file in Sauls v. Luchi, which is entirely intact, would have shown Mr. Whelan 
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that on November 8, 2006, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the undersigned in all 
respects in 2006 unpublished Opinion No. 71 5. That decision became final upon April 
16, 2007, with the filing of the Rernittitur in that case. In any event, the decisions made by 
the Court in Sauls v. Luchi were not made based upon bias or prejudice against Mr. 
Whelan. They were decisions based upon motions made by opposing counsel Charles 
Dean. The Court has reviewed its June 17,2005 "Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict" in Sauls v. Luchi. It is well 
reasoned. While Luchi filed his own appeal, if Mr. Whelan felt the judge was biased or 
prejudiced, or off base in its decision, or misunderstood the matter before it, there are 
mechanisms short of appeal Mr. Whelan could have used to bring that error to the Court's 
attention. That did not occur. In any contested motion, usually one side wins, one side 
loses. Sometimes one party wins in part and loses in part. Just because one side wins 
does not mean the judge's decision was based upon bias or prejudice against the party 
who lost or their attorney. The undersigned knows such was not the case in Sauls v. 
Luchi. 
Next, Mr. Whelan writes in his affidavit; 
5. In the case of Straub v. Smith, CV-04-5437 (Supreme Court No. 
31 955), your affiant was the attorney for the Defendants. In that case, the 
Plaintiff dismissed her action one week before a scheduled jury trial. The 
attorney for the Plaintiff, Scott Poorman, sought and received your affiant's 
stipulation to have the case dismissed. Your affiant reached no agreement 
with Mr. Poorman to waive costs and attorney fees. Yet, the order 
submitted to the Honorable John T. Mitchell by Mr. Poorman contained 
wording that the parties were to bear their own costs. The proposed order 
was not sent to your affiant before being submitted to the Court for signing. 
The Court signed the order as submitted. When the order was served on 
your affiant after it had been signed, your affiant filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration. The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read 
the motion. The motion was denied. The grounds for denial included the 
failure to cite a rule of procedure in support of the motion (yet such a rule 
was referenced in the motion). The claim for costs and attorney fees was 
denied on the additional ground that the Defendants' pleading did not 
contain a request for attorney fees (which 1.R.C.P Rule 54(e)(4) specifically 
states is not necessary). This ground for denial of the motion for 
reconsideration was not even asserted by Mr. Poorman in his opposition 
papers to the motion. The Court supplied Mr. Poorman with his argument. 
Attorney fees and costs were denied to your affiant and his clients even 
though the Court admonished Mr. Poorman for perpetrating a fraud on the 
Court. An appeal was filed by your affiant for the Defendants and the Court 
of Appeal overturned the trial court's ruling on the matter. The ldaho 
Supreme Court took the case on review but no decision has been issued on 
the review. Your affiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Straub v. 
Smith case was motivated by the Court's bias and prejudice against your 
affiant. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp. 3-4, 7 5. The rulings against Mr. Whelan's client in 
Straub v. Smith were simply not motivated in any way by bias or prejudice on behalf of 
this Court. The Court has reviewed the intact Court file in Straub v. Smith and is 
convinced of that fact. Mr. Whelan's affidavit raises several issues. Since Straub v. 
Smith is still under consideration by the ldaho Supreme Court, it would be inappropriate 
for this Court to comment on the merits of anything that occurred in that case. 
Mr. Whelan claims: "The Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the 
motion [to reconsider]." Id. A review of the court file in Straub v. Smith shows that a 
hearing was held on May 10, 2005, on Smith's (Mr. Whelan's client) Motion to 
Reconsider. At that hearing, a review of the court minutes show that not only did this 
Court indicate on the record that it had reviewed the Motion to Consider, but articulated 
the grounds Mr. Whelan set forth in that motion. The Court mentioned Jones v. Berezay, 
120 ldaho 332, 815 P.2d 1072 (1991) as a case on point, a case neither attorney in 
Sfraub cited to the Court. So not only did the Court read Mr. Whelan's motion to 
reconsider, since Mr. Whelan's motion contained no citations to any legal authority, the 
Court conducted its own research. 
The bottom line is that in Straub v. Smith, Mr. Whelan did what he should have 
done if he andlor his client disagreed with this Court's rulings.. . they filed a request for 076 
reconsideration and then an appeal. 
A request for reconsideration is exactly what the Lawrences did in Capstar v. 
Lawrence, CV 2002 7671, and an appear is exactly what Mr. Whelan and his clients have 
done in Capsfar and h w e r  Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621. An appeal is 
the appropriate action to take if you believe a judge has committed error, made a mistake, 
or misunderstood the facts or the law. The rulings made against Mr. Whelan's client in 
Capsfar and b w e r  Asset were not in any way made or motivated by bias or prejudice 
against Mr. Whelan by this Court. In fact, this Court's ruling in the Capstar case was 
made before Mr. Whelan even appeared in that case. The ruling was made in Capstar 
while the Lawrences were proceeding pro se. For the same reasons set forth above in 
Straub v, Smith, it would be inappropriate for this Court to discuss the merits of these two 
cases. 
Mr. Whelan claims bias or prejudice on behalf of the Court because counsel for 
plaintiffs in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 
CV 2003 4621 "...Susan Seeks [sic], the partner of Lee James, a friend of the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell and the current president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association." 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 4, 7 6. It is true that plaintiffs' counsel in Capstar and 
TbwerAsset, Susan Weeks, is in the same law firm as Lee James. However, the 
undersigned has no knowledge as to whether they are partners or what their professional 
relationship is. It is true that Lee James is president of the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association, but the undersigned was unaware of that fact until the undersigned read Mr, 
Whelan's affidavit and confirmed the fact by viewing the ITLA website. Mr. Whelan has 
not made clear what Mr. James being president of ITLA has to do with anything. The 
undersigned was a member of the ITLA five and one half years ago, but is not a member 
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now that he is a district judge. The undersigned was the attorney of record for ITL4 in the 
case In the Matter of the Estate of Dianne Rothe, but the undersigned received no 
frnancral remuneration for all time spent on that case. That matter was handled pro bono 
during the undersigned's involvement. In the general sense of the word, the undersigned 
IS a "frlend" of Lee James, but has not seen Lee James in other than a professional 
settlng in more than fourteen months. The last time the undersigned saw Lee James 
socially was at a fund raising event for ICARE, a child abuse prevention agency. Lee 
James may have appeared in court before the undersigned In the past fourteen months 
as an attorney in a hearing, but the undersigned has no recollection of that one way or 
another. The Court is confident it has not spoken to Lee James or seen Lee James 
socially since the CARE fund raising event. Along with Peter Erbland, Lee James helped 
organize a fund raising event for the undersigned in his re-election, but that occurred 
about fifteen months ago. The fund raising event was held at Mr. Erbland's law firm and 
other than that fact, the undersigned is not aware of what efforts Mr. James expended on 
that fund raising event. 
Mr. Whelan then makes the claim that: 
8. In the recent cases of Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252) and 
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358), where your affiant 
represents the Rogers and the Allens, Defendants in the actions, the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court will 
not entertain argument from your affiant unless the argument is supported 
by cases directly on point. Your affiant believes the Court has singled out 
your affiant for treatment that is different from the treatment received by 
other attorneys appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell. 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, 7 85. The claim that "the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
has seemingly made it clear that the Court will not entertain argument from your affiant 
unless the argument is supported by cases directly on point", without more, is a difficult 
claim in which to form a response. Since those are pending cases, it is improper to 
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respond to the merits of any legal arguments raised in those cases by Mr. Whelan. First 
of all, it should go without saying that argument supported by cases directly on point will 
be more persuasive than an argument lacking that support. Second, the allegation by Mr. 
Whelan that ". . .the Honorable John T. Mitchell has seemingly made it clear that the Court 
will not entertain argument from your affiant unless the argument is supported by cases 
directly on point" lacks specificity as to any particular ruling made at a particular hearing. 
A review of the court minutes on all hearings held in Krivor and Metropolitan show that at 
no time was Mr. Whelan not allowed to present argument, nor was he cut off on any 
argument, nor was he told that without cases on point his arguments would not be 
entertained. In Krivor: Mr. Whelan did not attend the January 30, 2007 hearing; Mr. 
Whelan did not attend the February 20, 2007, hearing; Mr. Whelan attended the April 26, 
2007, hearing and argued without interruption; Mr. Whelan did not attend the May 23, 
2007, hearing. In Metropolitan: Mr. Whelan did not appear at the December 19, 2006 
scheduling conference, he had on November 8, 2006 faxed the Court in chambers a copy 
of a Notice of Appearance, but no filing fee was paid so the pleading was not filed; 
Mr.Whelan attended the March 22, 2007 hearing and argued without interruption; Mr. 
Whelan attended the April 24, 2007 hearing and argued without interruption. If the Court 
in Krivor and Metropolitan failed to entertain an argument by Mr. Whelan, one would 
expect a motion for reconsideration. A review of the court files in Krivor v. Rogers (CV- 
06-6252) and Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358) reveals no motions 
for reconsideration filed by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his clients therein. 
A review of the court files in the following cases show no motion for disqualification 
for cause (I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)) has ever been filed: Krivor v. Rogers (CV-06-6252), 
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Allen (CV-06-6358), Straub v. Smith, (CV-04-5437), 
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Sauls v. Luchi (CV-04-1616). While that fact has little, if anything, to do with this Court 
not being biased or prejudiced against Mr. Whelan, if Mr. Whelan's feeling that this Court 
was biased or prejudiced against him goes back to November 21, 2001, one would have 
expected a motion for disqualification to have been made in one of these cases at an 
earlier time. On November 15, 2006, a motion to disqualify without cause (I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(l)) was made by Mr. Whelan on behalf of his client in Krivor v. Rogers, and that 
mot~on was granted on November 16, 2006. Following objection from opposing counsel 
as to the issue of service, that order was rescinded by an order dated November 20, 
2006. If there were concerns as to bias or prejudice of this Court, a motion for 
disqualification for cause would certainly have been anticipated in that case at that time. 
Decisions from the ldaho Supreme Court were issued on January 26, 2007, in 
Tbwer Asset Sub Inc., v. Lawrence and Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence. 
Mr. Whelan states that regarding those two cases an appeal was taken by the 
defendants, that the ldaho Supreme Court overturned the grant of summary judgment, 
then notes ''Your affiant believes that the result on the appeal has merely increased the 
bias and prejudice of the Court against your affiant." Affidavit of John P. Whelan, pp 4-5, 
6, 7. The Court has read the decisions in both cases and finds them to be well written. 
As noted by the ldaho Supreme Court, this Court committed error, and the ldaho 
Supreme Court reversed that error. Those appellate decisions are the "law of the case" in 
these two cases. This Court is human. It is quite a different thing to argue that because 
this Court committed error, which the ldaho Supreme Court corrected, that this Court 
would then hold against Mr. Whelan the fact he prevailed on behalf of his clients on those 
appeals. Quite the contrary. Mr. Whelan is to be commended for bringing those appeals 
and having the ldaho Supreme Court correct the mistake. He did the right thing. "The 
results of the appeal" (Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 5, fi 7), create no bias or prejudice 080  
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against Mr. Whelan whatsoever. The ldaho Court of Appeals held in Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 30, 81 3 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1991), "A disqualifying 
prejudice cannot be deduced from adverse rulings by a judge, whether they are right or 
wrong." Citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges 3 221 (1969). Adverse rulings alone do not support 
the existence of a disqualifying prejudice. Bell v. Bell, 122 ldaho 520, 835 P.2d 1331 
(Ct.App. 1992). "Merely because a judge has participated in prior legal proceedings 
involving related parties or issues does not provide grounds for the judge to recuse 
himself." Roselle v. Heirs and Devisees of Archie Grover, 11 7 ldaho 530, 534, 789 P.2d 
526, 530 (Ct.App. 1990). 
At oral argument on June 13, 2007, Mr. Whelan mentioned that in Capstar the 
Court found the language in the deed to be unambiguous, and the language in the same 
deed to be ambiguous in TowerAssef. Certainly that was a mistake by this Court, and 
that mistake was pointed out by the ldaho Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 5, n. 2 (January 26, 2006). However, that mistake by 
this Court does not indicate bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. To the extent the 
mistake needs to be explained to address any concerns of Mr. Whelan, it is explained as 
follows: On April 14, 2004, this Court heard argument on plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment in Capstar, and Lawrences' argument was presented by Douglas Lawrence, pro 
se. In granting summary judgment, the Court found the language of the deed and sales 
agreement unambiguous. The Lawrences pro se made a motion to reconsider in Capstar, 
and at hearing on that motion on April 29, 2004, this Court again stated the deed was 
unambiguous. The TowerAsset motion for summary judgment was heard seven months 
later on November 9, 2004, and argument was presented by Mr. Whelan. While the 
finding of ambiguitylunambiguity is inconsistent, the Court was faced with two different 
arguments by two diflerent people, one a lawyer and one not, on two different days seven 
months apart. The ambiguousJunambiguous nature of the deed and sales agreement 
was not the basis for the reversal in these cases by the ldaho Supreme Court. The ldaho 
Supreme Court found that neither the deed nor the sales agreement created an express 
easement. TowerAssef Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, pp. 6-7 (January 
26, 2006); Capsfar Radio Operafing Company v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 4 
(January 26, 2006). Thus, even if there were some logic to the argument that the Court 
was biased or prejudiced because the Court found the documents ambiguous in the case 
Mr. Whelan argued and unambiguous in the case Douglas Lawrence argued seven 
months earlier, that specific ruling was not relevant. What is relevant as far as any bias or 
prejudice by the Court is the fact that in both cases, one argued pro se by Douglas 
Lawrence and one argued by Mr. Whelan, the result was the same. There is no 
differential treatment by this Court as between Mr. Whelan or Douglas Lawrence. 
At oral argument on June 13, 2007, Mr. Whelan mentioned several issues he had 
not mentioned in his "Motion for Disqualification for Cause" or his "Affidavit of John P. 
Whelan". First, Mr. Whelan mentioned that he had won jury trials and court trials before 
the undersigned. At oral argument Mr. Whelan stated he had "...a string of motions that 
had not been granted by the Court." Not every attorney wins every motion, and not every 
attorney wins half of the motions they bring or defend. Mr.Whelanls affidavit mentions 
Sauls v. Luchi (one motion), Straub v. Smith (one motion and a motion to reconsider that 
motion) and now Capstar v. Lawrence (one motion but as previously mentioned, Mr. 
Whelan was not counsel for Lawrences when Capstar was decided) and Tower Asset 
Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence (one motion). Even if it were proper to base a claim of bias or 
prejudice upon past adverse rulings (Desfosses and Bell show it is not proper), four 
motions is hardly a significantly large statistical sample upon which to base a claim of bias 
or prejudice rest~ng upon prior decisions rendered. And if keeping score were proper (it is 
not), one would think you would weigh those motions against the court trials Mr. Whelan 
indicated he had won which were assigned to this Court. 
At oral argument Mr. Whelan for the first time raised the case of Whelan v. Mills, a 
fee dispute between Mr. Whelan and a client that was assigned to this Court, as another 
example of how this Court exhibited bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. Mr. Whelan 
did not have a case number, but the Court researched the matter and reviewed the court 
file in Kootenai County Case No. CV 2003 3582. In Whelan v. Mills Mr. Whelan in his 
complaint alleged the Mills owed him $1 1,903.74. In their answer the Mills claimed Mr. 
Whelan owed the Mills $4,085.00 for work they had done for Mr. Whelan. After a May 
24, 2004, court trial before the undersigned, this Court found the Mills owed Mr. Whelan 
$6,453.89. Part of the reason Mr. Whelan was found to not be entitled to all he was 
claiming was he had unilaterally raised his hourly rate from $125.00 to $150.00 per hour. 
The remaining reason Mr. Whelan was found to not be entitled to all he claimed was 
Greg Mills was entitled a credit for work he had performed on Mr. Whelan's land. 
However, instead of the $4.085.00 credit the Mills were seeking, the Court found them 
only entitled to $1,290.00. It is difficult to see how this Court's ruling in that case amounts 
to bias or prejudice against Mr. Whelan. 
Finally, while the following argument has not been made by Mr Whelan, it needs to 
be addressed. It could be argued that simply because Mr. Whelan has made this motion 
to disqualify, and his affidavit contains many allegations of bias and prejudice against the 
undersigned, such allegations of bias or prejudice alone would now render the Court 
biased and prejudiced. There have been other motions to disqualify the undersigned for 
cause in the past, and there will be similar motions in the future. While such motions are 
- - - -  --- - .  -- - - -  - - - - 
infrequent, the undersigned is duty bound to take the claims very seriously. The 
undersigned has given careful attention to the claims of bias and prejudice and can 
assure the parties and their attorneys, especially Mr. Whelan, that no bias or prejudice is 
present merely because this motion has been made. Mr. Whelan has concerns. Mr. 
Whelan is commended for bringing those concerns to the Court's attention. It is 
unfortunate that Mr. Whelan did not raise these concerns earlier as he has apparently 
harbored them for at least a couple of years since Sauls v.Luchi was decided. But Mr. 
Whelan has come forth and raised his concerns at this time in this motion to disqualify for 
cause in this case. He has that right. Indeed, if he is sincere in those concerns, and 
there is no reason to believe he is not sincere in those beliefs, then he has a duty to 
consult with his client, and if his client consents, to raise those concerns with the Court. 
The filing of this motion to disqualify for cause does not in any way result in bias or 
prejudice by the Court. The Court is neither insulted nor inconvenienced in any way by 
the filing of the motion. Mr. Whelan has concerns and the Court must address those 
concerns. The reason for the length of this written opinion is to address those concerns. 
The affidavit of Mr. Whelan uses terms such as: "Your affiant believes that Judge 
Mitchell disqualified himself.. . because.. .Judge Mitchell was biased or prejudice [sic] 
against John P. Whelan at that time" (Affidavit of John P. Whelan, p. 2, 7 3); "Your 
affiant believes that judge Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case because he 
had a 'personality conflict' with your affiant.. ." (Id.); "Your affiant believes that the Court's 
action was motivated by bias or prejudice against your affiant.. . " (Id. p. 3, 74); "The 
Honorable John T. Mitchell did not apparently read the motion" (Id. p. 3, 7 5); "Your 
affiant believes that the Court's ruling in the Staub v. Smith case was motivated by the 
Court's bias and prejudice against your affiant" (Id. p. 4, 7 5); and "Your affiant believes 
the Court has singled out your affiant for treatment that is different from the treatment 
received by other attorneys appearing before the Honorable John T. Mitchell" Id. p 5, f j  8. 
As stated by the ldaho Court of Appeals upholding a denial of a motion for disqualification 
for cause by a judge. "Suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, 
~nnuendo, and statements of mere conclusions ... may not be substituted for a statement 
of facts " Deshsses v. Desfosses, 120 ldaho 27, 30, 81 3 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.App. 1991), 
cit/ng Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287, 295 (1 952). While Mr. Whelan's 
concerns are not "facts", making this motion to disqualify for cause is about the only way 
he could air these concerns he has. Mr. Whelan's concerns are unfounded. That is not 
to say Mr. Whelan is not sincere when he says he has those feelings. But it is to say that 
this Court simply does not harbor the bias and prejudice alleged by Mr. Whelan. The 
undersigned is not biased or prejudiced against Mr. Whelan or against his present clients 
in this case, or his past clients in past cases. 
C. Campaign Contributions by Opposing Counsel's Firm. 
Mr. Whelan raised the issue of campaign contributions for the first time at oral 
argument on June 13, 2007. Mr. Whelan made an offer of proof that the firm of which 
Susan Weeks is a partner contributed $1,000 to the undersigned's re-election fund in the 
spring of 2006, according to the Sunshine Disclosure filed with the State of ldaho 
Secretary of State. At oral argument, Mr. Whelan also mentioned that attorney Scott 
Poorman, the attorney opposing Mr. Whelan in Straub v. Smith, supra, donated to the 
undersigned's re-election fund in the spring of 2006. The problem with the argument 
regarding Mr. Poorman is that the last action taken by this Court in Straub v. Smith 
occurred on May 10, 2005 (a year before the election and Mr. Poorman's contribution), 
when this Court signed the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
There cannot even be the appearance of a quidpro quo when the predicate contribution 
has not even yet occurred. 
As to the contribution to the undersigned's re-election fund by Ms. Week's firm, 
there was no evidence that Ms. Weeks made the contribution or that she consented to 
the contribution, or even that there is a partnership. If the Court were to assume that she 
consented and that her firm is a partnership, there still is no basis for the Court to 
disqualify himself. 
First of all, had the offer of proof not been made by Mr. Whelan at the hearing on 
June 13, 2007, the undersigned would still to this day be ignorant of what is contained in 
the Sunshine Report regarding Ms. Weeks' law firm. The Court disclosed on the record 
at the June 13, 2007, hearing the fact that it had not reviewed the Sunshine Report, but 
assumed it was accurate as the Court trusts his campaign treasurer who filed the report. 
The reason the Court has not reviewed the financial disclosure report is the Court must 
abide by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct. Cannon 5(C)(2) states in part: "Except as 
required by law, a candidate's judicial election committee should not disclose the names 
of contributors to judicial campaigns and judicial candidates and judges should avoid 
obtaining the names of contributors to the judicial campaign." Since the Court was at all 
times ignorant of this financial contribution, the Court could not and was not biased or 
prejudiced in favor of Ms. Weeks. Likewise, the Court was not biased or prejudiced 
against Mr. Whelan as a result of a contribution made by Ms. Weeks' firm, of which it 
was, up to June 13, 2007, ignorant. 
Now the Court has been made aware of that fact by Mr. Whelan, the Court must 
now make two determinations. First, does the knowledge of Ms. Weeks' firm's 
contribution result in any bias or prejudice in her favor? Second, is this now a 
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includes but is not limited to instances "where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party or a party's lawyer." Cannon 3(E)(l)(a). Campaign contributions of 
which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or other who appear before the judge, 
may be relevant to disqualification." Comment to Cannon 5(C)(2). 
This Court can honestly say that the contribution by Ms. Weeks' firm in no way 
results in any bias or prejudice in her favor. There are several reasons for this. First, 
there is more than one attorney in Ms. Weeks' firm. The firm's phone book ad lists three 
attorneys. It is unknown who made the decision to contribute. Second is the amount of 
the contribution. A candidate's committee may only solicit and accept reasonable 
contributions from lawyers. Cannon 5(C)(2). One thousand dollars is a reasonable 
amount from a firm of lawyers. According to Mr. Whelan's own offer of proof, other firms 
donated similar amounts or more. Third, since the undersigned was ignorant of the 
contribution until Mr. Whelan's offer of proof, obviously no one within the firm expected or 
asked for any preferential treatment as a result of the contribution. 
No cases were cited by Mr. Whelan on this issue at the June 13, 2007 hearing. 
Since the issue was raised by Mr. Whelan for the first time at hearing, Ms. Weeks cited 
no cases. Campaign contributions cannot serve as independent grounds for recusal. 
Degarmo v. State, 922 S.W.2d 256, 267 (Tex.App. 1996), citing River Road 
Neighborhood Association v. South Texas Sports, Inc. 673 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex.App. 
1984). In that case, the judge was found not to have abused his discretion when he 
accepted a $500 campaign contribution from a murder victim's family. Id. In Rocha v. 
Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.App. 1983), the Court of Appeals of Texas unanimously 
held that one of its members should not be disqualified even though two of the justices 
had received "...many thousands of dollars from or though the Law Office of Pat 
Maloney, P.C. (attorney for the appellees)". Id. In River Road Neighborhood Associ;lfion, 
673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.App. 1984), it was held that two justices on the Texas Court of 
Appeals, one who had received 21 .?Oh of his total reported campaign contributions, and 
another justice who had received 17. I % of his total reported campaign contributions from 
South Texas Sports, a party to the litigation, were not disqualified because neither of the 
"...challenged Justices may gain or lose anything of a pecuniary or personal nature 
because of any judgment that might be rendered in this case." The $1 000 contribution 
from Ms. Weeks' firm is significantly less than 17.1 % of all amounts contributed to the 
undersigned's campaign, as the undersigned himself spent $12,000.00 of his own funds 
on such campaign, and the undersigned is aware that over $50,000 was spent on the 
campaign (thus assumes about $38,000 was raised from other people). There is no 
contention made, nor is there any way possible the undersigned could gain or lose from 
any future rulings in either the Capstar or the TbwerAsset case. 
In MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store and MackKenzie v. Breakstone, 565 
So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1990), the Supreme Court of Florida held that an allegation in a motion 
for disqualification "...that a litigant or counsel for a litigant has made a legal campaign 
contribution to the campaign of the trial judge, or the political campaign of the trial judge 
or the trial judge's spouse (two consolidated cases on appeal) without more, is not a 
legally sufficient ground" for disqualification. 565 So.2d at 1334. The Florida Supreme 
Court noted: "As with other campaigns, judicial campaigns require funds." 565 So.2d at 
1335. "Judicial campaigns and the resultant contributions to those campaigns, therefore 
are necessary components to our judicial system." Id. The Florida Supreme Court noted 
that "...the United States Supreme Court has raised two concerns raised by contributions 
to campaigns for public office: 'I. The tendency or possibility to create a quid pro quo 
relationship and, 2. The creation of an appearance of influence or corruption."' Id. The 
Florida Supreme Court. then held: 
However, we find that Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct together with 
Florida's statutory limitation upon campaign contributions and the requisite 
public disclosure of such contributions, provide adequate safeguards 
against the above-entitled concerns regarding contributions to 
constitutionally mandated judicial campaigns and render the ground alleged 
in the motions at bar legally insuficient when presented as the sole ground 
for disqualification. 
565 So.2d at 1336. There are thus, three factors. First, the applicable Florida Judicial 
Conduct provision was that judicial candidates "should not himself solicit campaign funds, 
or solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of 
responsible person to secure and manage the expenditure of funds ..." Id. (emphasis in 
original). ldaho has essentially identical language: "A candidate shall not solicit 
campaign contributions in person." Canon 5(C)(2). "A candidate may establish 
committees of responsible person to conduct campaigns for the candidate through media 
advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other means not prohibited by 
law. Such committees may solicit and accept reasonable campaign contributions, 
manage the expenditure of funds. .." Id. Second, the per person campaign contribution 
limit in Florida for a district judge in 1990 was $2,000. 565 So.2d at 1336. In ldaho that 
amount at present is $1,000. ldaho Code Ij 67-6610A. Third, Florida statute requires 
disclosure by the campaign treasurer of amounts and name address and occupation of 
each person who made a contribution over $700. 565 So.2d at 1336. ldaho requires the 
same disclosure, but for any amounts over $50. ldaho Code Ij 67-6610. Thus, Idaho's 
statutes are twice as restrictive today as Florida's statutes were 17 years ago. 
In addition to the three factors discussed in MacKenzie, there are two additional 
factors that indicate that the campaign contributions are not legally sufficient grounds for 
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recusal in the instant case. Fourth, the passage of time since the contribution. The 
contribution had to have been over a year before Mr. Whelan brought his motion on 
behalf of the Lawrences. The fact of the contribution was available for Lawrences and 
Mr. Whelan to ascertain through the Secretary of State's website for nearly a year, yet 
nothing was mentioned until plaintiffs in the two cases renewed their motion for summary 
judgment. Fifth, the undersigned in fact did not know of the contribution by Ms. Weeks' 
firm until the June 13, 2007, hearing and heard of such only through Mr. Whelan. It is 
hard to have a quidpro quo relationship when one is ignorant of the contribution 
The Florida Supreme Court cited a Nevada Supreme Court case: 
In Florida, as in Nevada, "leading members of the state bar play important 
and active roles in guiding the public's selection of qualified jurists. Under 
these circumstances, it would be highly anomalous if an attorney's prior 
participation in a justice's campaign could create a disqualifying interest, an 
appearance of impropriety or a violation of due process sufficient to require 
the justice's recusal from all cases in which the attorney might be involved." 
Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 774 P.2d 1003, 1020 (Nev. 
[1989]) cert. denied 493 U.S. 958, 110 S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1989). 
565 So.2d at 1337-38. In MacKenzie, the Florida Supreme Court held that even though 
the ground (campaign contributions) was legally insufficient, the motion for disqualification 
should have been granted because in ruling on the motion for disqualification, Judge 
Mackenzie "went beyond a mere determination of the legal sufficiency of the motion and 
passed upon the truth of the facts alleged." 565 So.2d at 1339. This is because Florida 
has a rule that prohibits such. The Florida Supreme Court stated: "...our rules clearly 
provide, and we have repeatedly held, that a judge who is presented with a motion for his 
disqualification 'shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question 
of disqualification."' Id. "When a judge has looked beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a 
suggestion of prejudice and attempted to refute the charges of partiality, he has then 
exceeded the proper scope of his inquiry and on that basis alone established the grounds 
for his disqualification." Id. ldaho has no such rule. Obviously Texas has no such rule 
as the courts in the above cases discussed the allegations of prejudice. Obviously 
Nevada has no such rule as the reasons put forth by the judge who was sought to be 
disqualified (Justice Gunderson) were discussed in detail. Ainsworfh v. Combined Ins. 
Co. ofAmerica, 774 P.2d 1003, 1020-22 (Nev. 1989), cerf. denied 493 U.S. 958, I I 0  
S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1989). This Court finds that a simple denial of the Motion to 
Disqualify for Cause, without a discussion, would create an untenable result, in that 
neither Mr. Whelan nor his clients would have any idea how the Court treated these 
various allegations raised by Mr. Whelan. Should this decision be appealed and the 
ldaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals graft a rule that the judge may only adjudicate 
the question of disqualification, so be it. This Court is convinced that since there is no 
such rule, the more fair result to all parties and counsel is to discuss the various 
allegations. 
Ill. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the 
reasons set forth above, defendants' Motion for Disqualification for Cause pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2), in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 is DENIED and defendants' 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) in TbwerAsset Sub, 
Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621 is DENIED. 
Entered this 25th day of June, 2007. 
I certify that on the e copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail 
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JOHN P. WHEWN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N, 4'"treet 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,; (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
STATE OF tCW 
C: Kc(iiE&4i ) ss 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEMAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 




JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court, pursuant to Rules 12(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an 
Order for Permission to Appeal from an lnterlocurory Order. Defendants request 
an Order granting them permission to appeal the  erno or and urn Decision and 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 1 
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Order Denying Motion far Disqualification for Cause, 1.R.C.P 40(d)(2) filed June 
25, 2007. 
This motion i s  made on the grounds that good cause was shown for 
disqualification. Moreover, rhe Court engaged in an independent investigation 
of the facts and considered evidence gathered independently by the Court and 
which was not presented by counsel in reaching the Court's decision to not 
disqualify the Court from further proceedings. The independent investigation 
also incorporated speculation that was not warranted by the facts. 
Defendants request oral argument, 
DATED this q day of July, 2007, 
Respectfu Ily Submitted, 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on the 474 day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
US. Nail, postage prepaid 
Via: 7 Facsimile: (208) 564-1 684 
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P,G, 
2 1 3 N, 4th Street 
Goeur dYAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208)664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 





JUDGE; JOHN T, MITCHELL 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, 
by and through their attorney, John P. Whelan, hereby move the Court for 
reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Notion 
for Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2). This Motion is  made pursuant to 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - I 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1 1  (a). This motion is made on the grounds 
that the court should have ruled on the motion based on the evidence offered. 
The Court should not have conducted its own independent investigation of the 
facts without the permission of caunsel. 
This motion is based on the court's files and records in this proceeding 
together with any affidavits filed in support of this motion, 
Defendants request oral argument . 
DATED this 7 day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P, WHELM,  P.C. 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9r' day of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alenc, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
J ~ a c s i r n i ~ e :  (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N, 4rh street 
Coeur dJAIene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5 891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaint iff, 
DOUGLAS P. WWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO, CV-02-9671 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
HEARlNG DATE: 
TINE: 
JUDGE: John T, Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Koarenai 1 
I, John P. Whelan, being f i rst  duly sworn, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 1 
1.  1 am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
competently testify. This affidavit is offered in support of Defendants' motion 
for reconsideration of an order of the Court denying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed o n  June 25, 2007, 
2. In the course of  making the decision on Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause the Court obviously engaged in independent fact 
finding before reaching a decision an Defendants' motion. The Court even 
reviewed a case that was not identified by this affiant as being relevant to the 
motion far disqualification. Additionally, the Court engaged in speculation in 
creating an argumenr for denial of the motion for disqualification when the clear 
inference to be drawn from the evidence offeredwas that the Court disqualified 
i tsel f  in the case of Yovichin v. Bush (CV-2001-2 1 1 6) for bias and prejudice 
against this affiant, 
3. The Court then based the denial of Defendants' motion for 
disqualification on the Court's independent investigation of the facts and the 
speculation as ro why the Court disqualified itself in Yovtcbin v, Bush (CV-2001- 
21 16). The speculation and independent investigation by the Court was 
improper, thus increasing the appearance of impartiality. Idaho Code of judicial 
Conduct  Canon 3. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 2 




DATED this 7 day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this qT' day of July, 2007. 
My Comm. Expires: 12/&/11 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEMN - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the QT* day of July, 2007. 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
f usan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
, / Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
]OWN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 13 N. 4'h Street 
Goeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a C)elaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN P. WHELAN 
HEARING DATE: August 6,  2007 
TIME: 1 :30 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
ss, 
County of Kootenai 1 
I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 .  I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence, I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 1 
competently testify. Thls affidaviws offered in support of Defendants' rnotion 
for reconsideration of an order of the Court denying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuant to 1,R.C.P' 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007. 
2. On behalf of the Lawrences I filed a motion requesting that the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualify himself 'for cause due to bias and/or 
prejudice against your affiant. The Court did not rule on the motion when the 
oral argument was presented on June 13, 2007, the matter was taken under 
su bmission 
3 .  On June 25, 2007, the Court filed its decision denying the motion 
for disqualification. The decision was filed only after the Court conducted i t s  
own independent investigation into the facts. The decision of the Court was 
obviously based on matters outside of the record in this proceeding, and based 
on matxers not even referenced by your affiant in the motion or at oral 
argument. 
4. Your affiant made no reference to the case of the Estate of Diane 
Rothe, Case No. SP 00675 (2000). The Court nevertheless performed an 
independent: review of this case and opined that the case may have been the 
reason why the Court. voluntarily disqualified itself in the case of Yovjchin v. 
Bush, a case where your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in 
the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2007 decision that the voluntary 
disqualification might have been filed due to the adversarial role that attorney 
MZrchell played In that case before taking the bench. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHEIAN - 2 
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5. The Esl;;rt'e of Diane Rorhe was a probate action. Your affiant was 
the attorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided for a contingent 
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association for educational purposes. The ldaho Trial Lawyers Association did 
not have a vested gift from the estate. The "gift" was entirely discretionary on 
the part of the trustee of the trust. Attorney John T. Mitchell was the Treasurer 
of the ITL4 at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent letter after letter to your affiant 
over a ten (1 0) month period. The corresponderice demanded information from 
the file and sought to counsel your afliant as tol how to probate the estare and 
what his obligations were. Ar one point, attorney MCtchell filed a Petition for' 
Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the 
position of personal representative of the estate. Attorney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the case so that a third party could 
be appointed as personal representative of the estate. 
6. My rlEen~ wanted to report attorney Mitchell to the State Bar for 
seeking the appoinrrnenr of a substitute personel representative when attorney 
Mitchell did not represent the person who attorney Mitchell sought to appoint as 
substitute personal representative of the estate. 
7. A true and correct copy of a letter acknowledging this fact is 
attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received frqm attorney Mitchell. 
8. The relationship between myself and:: rhen attorney Mirchell was nor 
adversarial, it was hostile. Leeander James took over the Rothe case from 
attorney Mitchell when he rook the bench. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 
9. Although not mentioned by the ~ o b r t  in the decision denying the 
motion for disqualification, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case 
I 
together before attorney Mitchell took the bench: That case was Diteman v, R & 
L RV Sales and Service, /nc., Case No. 6V-0'9-3973 1 questioned attorney 
F 
Mitchell's ethics in that case as well in t h e  course of my representation of R & L 
i RV, That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used recreational vehicle. 
t 
Apparently a prior owner had rolled-back h e  odometer reading of the 
I 
vehicle-erasing rhousands of miles of use. R & was unaware of this fact when 




10. The attorney who represented R & L before your affiant took over 
the representation had erroneously answered covery request that made it 
appear that R & L had not been supplied an o ter disclosure form when in 
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell. 
I Although R & L RV committed no wrong, attorne Mitchell would not dismiss the 
company from the lawsuit. I questioned the ethics of atrorney Mitchell in 
'1 continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong. 
I 
1 .  R & L RV eventually bought its w y out of the case through a 
statutory offer of settlement. 
12.  The cases of Rothe and R cfZ L RV p ovide the background far why 4, 
the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqdalified himself in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where I was counsel for .ti e Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WWEUN - 4 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theqT day of .J ly, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 9 the method indicated belaw, 
and addressed to the following: , ti: 
I j .  
Susan P. Weeks !I! 
James, Vernon & Weeks i 
ig :  
Attorneys at Law 1; 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive , .II 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Al ne, ID 83814 4 
Via; U.S. Mail, postage prepaid : 1, :  , 
I I 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 iii 
AFFIDAVrT' OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 5 
JOHN P. WWELAN, P.C. 
2 13 N. 4" street 
Gaeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISW 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P.  LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
HEARING DATE: August 6, 2007 
TIME: 1 ;30 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through 
their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submits the following memorandum in 
support of motion for reconsideration: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel for the Lawrences filed a motion requesting rhat the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell disqualify himself for cause due to bias and/or prejudice against 
the Lawrences' counsel. The Coun did not rule on the motion when the oral 
argument was presented on June '1 3, 2007. 
On June 25, 2007, the Court filed i ts  decision denying the motion for 
disqualification. The decision was filed only after the Court conducted its own 
independent investigation into the facts. The decision of the Couut: was 
obviously based on matters outside of the record in rhis proceeding, and based 
on matters not even referenced by counsel in the motion or at oral argument. 
Counsel for the tawrences made no reference t o  the case of theEstate o f  
Diane Rathe, Case No. SP 00675. The Court nevertheless performed an 
independent review of this case and opined that the case may have been the 
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified itself in the case of Yovichin v. 
Bush, a case where the Lawrences' counsel was the attorney of record for the 
Defendants in the action. The Court: speculated in i t s  june 25, 2007 decision 
that the voluntary disqualification might have been filed due to the adversarial 
role that attorney Mitchell played in that case before taking the bench. 
The listate ofDiane Rothe was a probate action, John P. Whelan was the 
attorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rorhe provided for a contingent 
bequest to the ldaho Trial Lawyers Association for educational purposes. The 
ldaho Trial Lawyers Association did not have a vested gift from the estate. The 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
"'gift" was discretionary with the trustees of a trust that was to be created. 
Attorney John T, Mitchell was the Treasurer of the ITLA at the rime. Atrorney 
Mitchell sent over a dozen letters to attorney Wheian over a ten (1 0)  month 
period. The correspondence demanded information from the f i le  and sought to 
counsel attorney Whelan as to how he should probate the estate and what his 
obligations were. At one point, attorney Mitchell filed a Petition for Removal of 
Personal Representative seeking to remove attorney Whelan's client from rhe 
position of personal representative of the estate. Attorney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the case so that a third party could 
be appointed as personal representative of the estate. 
Attorney Whelan's client wanted to report attorney Mitchell to the State Bar 
for seeking the appointment of a substitute personal representative when 
attorney Mitchell did not represent the person who attorney Mitchell sought to 
appoint as substitute personal representative of the estate. 
A copy of a letter acknowledging this fact is attached to the accompanying 
supplemental affidavit of  John P. Whelan. 
The relationship between attorney Whelan and then attorney Mitchell was 
not adversarial, it was hostile. Leeander James took over the Rothe case from 
attorney Mitchell when he took the bench, 
Although not mentioned by the Court in the decision denying the motion 
for disqualification, arrorney Mirchell and] arrorney Whelan had a second case 
together before attorney Mitchell took the bench. That case was Diteman R B 
1 RVSalesandService, lnc., Case No. CV-00-1973. Attorney Whelan 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
questioned attorney Mttchell's ethics in that case In the course of Whelan's 
representation of R & L RV. That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used 
recreational vehicle. Apparently a prior owner had rolled-back the odometer 
reading of the vehicle-erasing thousands of miles of use. R & L was unaware of 
rhis fact when it bought that used recrearlonal vehicle. 
The attorney who represented R 81 L RV before attorney Whelan took over 
the representation had erroneously answered a discovery request that made it 
appear that R & L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in 
fact it had. Attorney Whelan brought the error to the attention of attorney 
Nirchell. Although R 8r L RV committed no wrong, attorney Mitchell would not 
dtsrn~ss the company from the lawsuit. Attorney Whelan questioned the ethics 
of attorney Mitchell in continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company 
cornmirted no wrong. 
R & L RV eventually bought i ts  way out ofthe case through a statutory 
offer of settlement. 
The cases of Rorhe and R & L Rvprovide the background for why the 
HonorableJohn T. Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where attorney Whelan was counsel for rhe Defendants 
IT IS IMPROPER FOR A IUDGE TO PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE FACTS OF A CASE 
The presentation of evidence is a role performed by attorneys. Idaho 
Code prohibits judges from acting as attorneys. I.C. 1-1 802 and 1 - 1  803. 
MEMORANOUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
Although stated in dicta, the Supreme Coun in State v. Breyer. 40 ldaho 
324, 232, P. 560 (1 925) alluded to the fact that it would be clearly improper for 
a Judge to make an independent investigation of the facts in a case (or motion). 
JUDICIAL CANON 3 E l l  )(a] 
Canon 3 of the ldaho Code of Judicial Conduct recites that a judge shall 
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including situations where the Judge has a 
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or has 
personal knowlcdqe of disputed evidentiaw facts. (Emphasis added). 
ARGUMENT 
The Lawrences counsel presented facts which would suggest, at the very 
least, that the Honorable John T. Mitchell's impartiality might be reasonably be 
questioned. The Court: took it upon itself to attempt to prove the Lawrences' 
counsel wrong by conducting an independent investigation of the facts. This is  
seemingly improper. Furthermore, counsel i s  placed in a position of having to 
argue that the Court's investigation was faulty and rhax the conclusions reached 
were not justified. 
Counsel urges the Court to reconsider i t s  denial of the motion for 
disqualification for cause based on these facts. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 5 '  
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
'v. Attorney whelan for Defendants 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 6 
I HERESY CERTIFY that on the &>day ofJuly, 2007, 1 caused ro be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
t/ Via: U.S. Nail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 t 3 N. 4Ch Srreer 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 8381 4 
Tele,: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. L4WRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
(WITH EXHIBIT AITACHED) 
HEARING DATE: Augusr 6, 2007 
TINE: 1 :30 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T, Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
Cou nry o f  Kootenai 1 
I, John P. Whelan, being f i r s t  duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 .  1 a m  the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of the  following facts and could 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WMELAN - 1 
competently testify. This affidavit is offered in support: of Defendantshation 
far reconsideration of an order of the Court denying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.G.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007, 
2. On behalf of the Lawrences I filed a motion requesting that the 
Honorable John T, Mirchell disqualify himself for cause due to bias and/or 
prejudice against your affiant. The Court did not rule on the motion when the 
oral argument was presented on June 13, 2007, the matter was taken under 
su bmission 
3.  On June 25 ,  2007, the Court filed its decision denying the motion 
for disqualification. The decision was filed only after the Court conducted its 
own independent investigation into the facts, The decision of the Court was 
obviously based an matters outside of the record in this proceeding, and based 
on matters not even referenced by your affiant in the motion or at oral 
argument. 
4, Your affiant made no reference to the case of the E s t ~ t e  o f  Diane 
Rothe, Case No. SP 00675 (2000). The Court nevertheless performed an 
independent review of this case and opined that the case may have been the 
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified itself in the case of Yovichi' v. 
Bush, a case where your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in 
the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2007 decision that the voluntary 
disqualification rnighf have been filed due to the adversarial role that attorney 
Mitchell played In that case before taking rhe bench. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 2 
5. The Estate of Diane Rothe was a probate action. Your affiant was 
the attorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided for a contingent 
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association for educational purposes. The ldaho Trial Lawyers Association did 
not have a vested gifr from the estate. The '"gift" was entirely discretionary on 
the part of the trustee of the trust. Attorney John T. Mitchell was the Treasurer 
of the ITCA at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent letter after letter to your affiant 
over a ten (1 0) month period, The correspondence demanded information from 
the file and sought to counsel your affiant as to how to probate the estate and 
what his obligations were, At one point, attorney Mitchell filed a Petition for 
Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the 
position of personal representative of the estate. Attorney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the case so that a third party could 
be appointed as personal representative of the estate. 
6. My client wanted to report attorney Mitchell to the State Bar for 
seeking the appointment of a substi~ute personal representative when attorney 
Mitchell did not represent the person who attorney Mitchell sought to appoint as 
substitute personal representative of the estate. 
7. A true and correct copy of a letter acknowledging this fact is  
attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received from attorney Mitchell. 
8, The relationship between myself and then attorney Mitchell was not 
adversarial, it was hostile, Leeander James took over the Rothe case from 
attorney Mitchell when he took the bench. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN - 3 
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9. Although not mentioned by the Caurt in the decision denying the 
motion far disqualffication, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case 
together before attorney Mltcheil took the bench. That case was Diteman v. R d; 
f RV Sales and Service, hc., Case No. CV-00-1973 I questioned attorney 
Mitchell's ethics in that case as  well in the course of my representation of R & L 
RV. That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used recreational vehicle, 
Apparently a prior owner had rolled-back the odometer reading of the 
vehicle-erasing thousands of miles of use. R & L was unaware of this fact when 
it bought that used recreational vehicle. 
10. The attorney who represented R & L RV before your affiant took over 
the representarion had erroneously answered a discovery request that: made it 
appear that R 8( L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in 
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell, 
Although R & L RV committed no wrong, attorney Mitchell would not dismiss the 
company from the lawsuit. I questioned the ethics of attorney Mitchell in 
continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong. 
1 1 .  R & L RV eventually bought i t s  way out of the case through a 
statutory offer of settlement. 
12, The cases of Rothe and R & L RV provide the background for why 
the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case of 
Yovichin v. Bush, a case where I was counsel for the Defendants. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WWELAN - 4 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
At rn y for Defendants JOuwhe'an 
d 
Subscribed and sworn before me this & day of July, 2007. 
he State of Idaho 
Residing a t : z . q t  
My Comrn. Expire 
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THOMAS A. MITCHELL 
JOHN T. MITC)IELL 
Anameye At  taw 
408 E. Shenan A~enue, Suite 318 
Coeur a'Alens. ID e3e14.2778 
Facsimile (208) 684.8113 
E-Mall: jmrtchel@dmI net 
December 1,2000 
Fax: (208) 765-1046 
J.  P. Whelm 
702 N. 4Ih, Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14 
Dear Mr. Whelan: 
RE: Estate of Dianne Rothe 
1 have scheduled a hearing on our Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for 
Cause, and for Appointment of Successor Personal Representative, for January 29, 200 1, at 
9:30 a.m. before Judge Marno.  A Notice of Hearing is enclosed, 
Perhaps this matter can be resolved short of that hearing. 
The purpose of this letter is to clear up some of the things that you stated during the 
November 27,2000 deposition of Jim Hannon. 
You stated that your client, Butch Rothe, wanted you to turn me into the Idaho State 
Bar. I encouraged you to do that if you felt necessary. You then told me that you told your 
;!icats t t  'SJ'I? rr.c into ths 5% 2J:mse!~les. Agnin, if pither you or they feel rhar f have done 
anything unethical, please have them report me to the bar. If you feel I have done any-thing 
unethical, you have an affirmative obligation to turn me into the bar. 
During the deposition, you asked Jim Hannon if he had ever discussed with Dianne 
Rothe, that her whole gift to the foundation could fail because Jim Hannon named himself as 
a Trustee. That theory which you articulated finds no suppon in rhe law. Please review 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(c) which states that a lawyer shall not prepare an 
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling, or 
spouse any substantial gi& From client, including a testamenrary g& except whsrs the client 
is rclated to the donee, Clearly, Jim-Hannon as a trustee is not the recipient of any "gift" 
W 
under the trust. Case law from other jurisdictions states that a lawyer-beneficiarv's 
participation in rhe preparation or execution of die Will raises the presumption of undue 
influence, again, Mr. Hannon was not, nor can he be a &peficiarv under Dianne's Will. A 
similar result is found when you review ABA Cannon 5, ethical consideration 5-6, that states 1 2 0 
a lawyer shall not conscientiously influence a client to name him as axecutor, trustee, or 
. . Y . t  . . .. . 7 . .  .. - - 1 ' -  -&--.:-I--- .L- . - - . - - I - ! -  1 - -  - - - -  L 
J. P. Whelan 
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Gare shall be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, I think Mr. 
Hamon covered in his deposition, the fact that it was Dianne who wished Jim Hannon and 
her other attorneys, to serve as co-trustees. 
In any event, there are W o  separate issues. You asked if Jim H m o n  had considered 
the fact that he had named himself as trustee, to be an ethical violation. If vou view it as an 
unethical violation, have a duty to report Mr. Hannon to the bar. An entirely separate 
issue is whether the fact that Jim Hannon is named as a trustee causes the entire gift to fail, 
which is exactly what you insinuated during the deposition. There simply isn't any legal 
basis to support your allegation. 
Next, in the deposition you raised the theory that if these attorney trustees resigned, 
and since there is no provision for replacement, the trust would fail. Once again, there is no 
legal theory to support your claim. Please look at Idaho Code 568-101 and Idaho Code 968- 
102. The trust survives the renunciation of other trustees, and if, by chance, all the trustees 
sliould renounce, the District Court & appoint replacements, 
You mentioned that all of the attorney trustees had renounced their interest in serving 
as rmsrets, but that begs the question. The foundation hasn't been created yet, due to your 
client's failure to perform his duties as personal representative. I don't see how any 
renunciation can be valid until the estate kicks loose the funds ro create the foundation. 
Afier the deposition, you asked about the possibility of settlement. The Idaho Trial 
Lawyers Association is certainly interested in settlement. When you discussed settlement, 
you mentioned the possibility of this case being dragged out, and the specter of attorney fees 
reducing the value of any money that could be available for the foundation. I suggest you 
take another look at the probate code to determine who will be paying for your attorney's 
fees. Since the probate was converted to a formal probate, you cannot receive attorney's fees 
out of probate assets without the court's prior approval. While I agree that your office would 
be entitled to attorney's fees for preparing the initial probate pleadings, your office is not 
entitled to any other attomey fees for time spent contesting the validity of the Will. It would 
be unethical for an attorney to charge attorney's fees against the estate for such an action, as 
the personal representative has a duty to the lega~ies under the Will, to enforce the Will and 
defend the Will, contesr the Will. Additionally, the personal representative has a duty to 
maximize the estate left for the legacies. The personal representative simply cannot challenge 
the validity of the Will, and seek to have his attorney fees for doing so paid from the assets 
from the estate. I direct your attention to Idaho Code $15-3-703(a), Idaho Code $1 5-3-709, 
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I also don't see how you are going to get your attorney fees paid for out of the estate, 
for time spent discussing matters with me, since the vast majority of that time has been spent 
with my trying to get you to get your client to meet his duties under Tdclho law ro the 
beneficiaries under the Will. 
My suggestion is as follows. Your client prepares a detailed inventory and accounting 
that can be verified, and find out what is left over after the payment of legitimate expenses. 
This would include itemized statements of the interest bearing account sl~owing what interest 
has accrued since the account's inception, and also what expenses have been paid by the 
estate since the decedent's death and what expenses are claimed and unpaid against the estate. 
The trustees can then convene to determine what is to be done with the remaining funds. 
JTM: cs 
Enc. 
cc; Kay Shields 
Jim Hannon 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the %?day ofjuiy, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d '  Alene, ID 8381 4 
.S, Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
HEARING DATE: August 7, 2007 
TIME: 4:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through 
their attorney, John P. Whelan, in accordance with Rules of  Evidence Rule 201 
and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 44(d), hereby request that the Court take 
judicial notice of the matters identified herein, which matters are referenced in 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary 
Judgment: 
1.  Courtfi lesregardingcaseofLoudenv.Stokes,McFeron,Wo/fe,Case 
Number 65077, Kootenai County District Court, 1987. 
2 .  That Metsker maps have been relied upon for their accuracy for 
many decades and the maps are readily verifiable. 
?J/l day of July, 2007. DATED this 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
Att rn y for Defendants JOuwhelan 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '/LL/day of  July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Al e, ID 8381 4 
Via: Z . S .  Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
21 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
. 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
HEARING DATE: August 7, 
2007 
TIME: 4:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their counsel of  record, John P. Whelan, and hereby motion this 
court, pursuant to Rules 6(b) and 56(c) and 56(0 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for an enlargement of time in which to file their opposition in 
response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendants request to 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1 
file their response on or after November 1 ,  2007. The affidavits of John P. 
Whelan and Doug Lawrence are offered in support of  this motion. Defendant's 
request oral argument. 
This motion i s  made on the grounds that Defendant's have not had the 
opportunity to complete discovery and determine the whereabouts of the 
various witnesses whose affidavits are relied upon by Plaintiff, as Plaintiff's 
counsel filed a motion for summary judgment shortly after the Remittitur issued 
in this case. Defendants made a prior motion for enlargement that was never 
ruled upon by the Court. No further discovery has taken place since the motion 
was made due to the fact that the Court has yet to rule on the original motion 
for enlargement. Defendants have yet to complete their discovery in the instant 
action, so additional time to respond to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
i s  warranted. Defendants anticipate that they will take the depositions of each 
person who has submitted an affidavit for Plaintiff in this action. Many of  the 
witnesses are believed to reside out of state. 
DATED this q' day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
ey for Defendants 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the w d a y  of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: L/ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Joh P. Whelan 
I_> 
JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
HEARING DATE: August 7, 2007 
TIME: 4:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
Plaintiffs, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by and through their 
attorney of record, John P. Whelan, hereby move the court to strike the 
objectionable portions of the Affidavits of Harold Funk and John Rook, identified 
herein, which affidavits were offered in support to Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. This motion is  made on the grounds of I.R.C.P. Rule 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
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7(b)(l), 1 2(f) and 56(e) and the case of Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co,, 1 1 1 P. 3d 
162 (Id. Ct App. 2005). Defendants requests oral argument. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FUNK 
Defendants move to strike the following portions of  the Affidavit of Harold 
Funk: 
Defendants move to strike Ex. A on the same grounds. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 





Paragraph 3, pg. 2, 
last sentence 
Paragraph 4, pg. 2, 
1 s t  sentence 
Paragraph 6, pg. 3, 
4th through 7th 
sentences 
Paragraph 6, pg. 3, 










under the doctrine of  
merger.' 
Funk's contract with his 
predecessor i s  irrelevant 
under the doctrine of 
merger. 
Funk fails to identify the 
relevant time period. 
Funk's sale agreement 
merged into the deed to 
Human Synergistics. 
The Funk's intent is  
irrelevant parole evidence 
in that the land contract 
merged with the deed 
and the deed is  not 
ambiguous. 
Defendants also move to strike Ex. " F  as well as hearsay evidence. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 3 
second to last statement of  "continuous 
use" is not supported by 
Relevance; hearsay The sale agreement 
last sentence merged with the deed; 
therefore the land sale 
contract is  irrelevant in 
which parcel he refers to, 
9. Paragraph 9, pg. 4, 




rendering the statement 
irrelevant. Funk also 
does not identify which 
"same private road" he 
refers to, and whether 
the road i s  on the 
Lawrence parcel. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROOK 
Defendants move to strike the following portions of  the Affidavit of John 
Rook: 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 4 
oundation for his 
2. Paragraph4, pg. 2, 
1 s t  sentence 
Foundation; relevance 
claimed knowledge of 
the access to  the 
parcels; Rook does not 
identify "the road" he 
refers to or i t s  location. 
Rook does not lay the 
foundation for his 
alleged knowledge of 
the access to the Funk 
land; he does not 
identify the subject road 
or i t s  location. 
MOTION TO STRIKE - 5 
improper opinion 
claimed knowledge of 
the road location; Rook 




Paragraph 4, pg. 3, 
3rd, 4th and 5th 
sentences 
Paragraph 4, pg. 3, 
last sentence 






expert opinion as a 
surveyor without 
foundation. At best, 
Rook only identifies "the 
road" as being located in 
the 160 acres of  the SE 
1 / 4  of Section 21, T50, 
R5W, of which the 
Lawrences own only a 
portion. 
Rook claims to have 
knowledge of Funk's 
habits but lays no 
foundation; the "road" 
location i s  not 
identified. 
No facts are offered in 
support of  this 
conclusionary statement 
regarding the use of the 
road. 
No foundation is  laid for 
the hearsay map. 
he claim regarding 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
By: 
( Jopn P. Whelan 
w r n e y  for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the v d a y  of July, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' A1 ne, ID 83814 9 Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
John P Whelan,  P C 
JOHN P. WHEUN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF K007"ENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-02-7671 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
(WITH UXHlBlT ATTACHED) 
HEARING DATE: Augusr 6, 2007 
TIME: 1 :30 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 .  I am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and could 
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competently testiw. This affidavit is offered in support of Defendantshotion 
for reconsideration of an order of the Court denying Defendants' motion for 
disqualification for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed on June 25, 2007. 
2. On behalf of the Lawrences I filed a motjon requesting that the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell disqualifj/ himself for cause due to bias and/or 
prejudice against your afTiant. The Court did not rule on the motion when the 
oral argument was presented on June 13, 2007, the matter was taken under 
su bmission 
3. On June 2 5 ,  2007, the Court filed i t s  decision denying the motion 
for disqualification. The decision was filed only after the Court conducted its 
own independent investigation into the facts. The decision of the Court was 
obviously based on matters outside of the record in this proceeding, and based 
on matters nor even referenced by your affiant in the motion or at oral 
argument. 
4. Your affiant made no reference to the case of the Estate o f  Diane 
Rothe, Case No. SP 00675 (2000). The Court nevertheless performed an 
independent review of this case and opined that the case may have been the 
reason why the Court voluntarily disqualified itself in the case of Yovichin v. 
Bush, a case where your affiant was the attorney of record for the Defendant in 
the action. The Court speculated in its June 25, 2007 decision that the voluntary 
disqualification might have been filed due to the adversarial role that attorney 
Mitchell played in that case before taking the bench. 
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5. The Estate of Diane Rothe was a probate action. Your afTiant was 
the attorney for the estate. The will of Diane Rothe provided for a contingent 
bequest (in the sole discretion of the trustees) to the ldaho Trial Lawyers 
Association for educational purposes. The ldaho Trial Lawyers Association did 
not have a vested gift: from the estate. The "gift" was entirely discretionary on 
the part of the trustee of the trust, Anorney John T. Mitchell was the Treasurer 
of the ITLA at the time. Attorney Mitchell sent let ter  after letter to your afiiant 
over a ten ( I  0) month period. The correspondence demanded information from 
the file and sought to counsel your affiant as to how to probate the estate and 
what his obligations were. At one point, attorney Mitchell filed a Petition for 
Removal of Personal Representative seeking to remove my client from the 
position of personal representative of the estate. Attorney Mitchell sought to 
have the son of Diane Rothe removed from the case so that a third party could 
be appointed as personal representative of the estate. 
6. My client wanted to report attorney Mitchell to the State Bar for 
seektng the appointment of a substitute personal representative when attorney 
Mitchell did not represent the person who attorney Mitchell sought to appoint as 
substitute personal representative of the estate, 
7. A true and correct copy of a letter acknowledging this fact is 
attached as Exhibit A. The letter was received from attorney Mitchell. 
8. The relationship between myself and then attorney Mitchell was not 
adversarial, it was hostile. Leeander James took over the Rothe case from 
attorney Mitchell when he took the bench. 
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9,  Although not mentioned by the Court in the decision denying the 
motion for disqualffication, attorney Mitchell and your affiant had a second case 
together before attorney Mitchell took the bench. That case was Diteman v. R te 
L RV Sales and Service, /nc., Case No. CV-00-1973 I questioned attorney 
Mitchell's ethics in that case as well in the course of my representation of R & L 
RV. That was a case where R & L RV purchased a used recreational vehicle. 
Apparently a prior owner had rolled-back the odometer reading of the 
vehicle-erasing thousands of miles of  use. R & L was unaware of this fact when 
it bought that used recreational vehicle. 
10. The attorney who represented R & L RV before your affiant took over 
the representation had erroneously answered a discovery request that made it 
appear that R & L had not been supplied an odometer disclosure form when in 
fact it had. Your affiant brought the error to the attention of attorney Mitchell. 
Although R & L RV committed no wrong, attorney Mitchell would not dismiss the 
company from the lawsuit. I questioned the ethics of attorney Mitchell in 
continuing to pursue R & L RV even though the company committed no wrong. 
1 1 .  R & L RV eventually bought its way out of the case through a 
statutory over of settlement. 
12. The cases of Rothe and R & L R V  provide the background for why 
the Honorable John T. Mitchell voluntarily disqualified himself in the case of 
Yuvjchin v. Bush, a case where I was counsel for the Defendants. 
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DATED this day of July, 200'7. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
At n y for Defendants J O u W h e l a n  
rrE Subscribed and sworn before me this & day of July, 2007 
he State of Idaho - 
Residing at:%+ GILT , 
My Comrn. Expires: 12/29/11 
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Tnoms A. M ~ C H E L L  
TOWN T. MITrnE1IL 
Anameys AI LBW 
408 E. Shenan Avenue, Surte 318 
Coaut U'Alene. ID 83814.2778 
Facsimile (208) M34.8113 
E-Mali. jmitchalriadmr net 
December 1,2000 
Fax; (208) 765-1046 
J. P. Whelm 
702 N. 4", Suite 200 
Coeur dYAlene, fD 838 14 
Dear Mr. Whelm: 
RE: Estate of D i m e  Rothe 
I have scheduled a hearing on our Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for 
Cause, and for Appointment of Successor Personal Representative, for January 29, 2001, at 
9130 a.m. before Judge Mslrano. A Notice of Hearing is enclosed, 
Perhaps this matter can be resolved short of that hearing. 
The purpose of this letter is to clear up some of the things that you stated during the 
November 27,2000 deposition of Jim Hannon. 
You stated that your client, Butch Rothe, wanted you to tum me into the Idaho State 
Bar. I encouraged you to do that if you felt necessary. You then told me that you told your 
;licats tc k m  mc int3 the S s  2.r1h,~mse!~es. .4lj9in, if either you nr they feel rhar I have done 
anything unethical, please have them report me to the bar. If you feel I have done anything 
unethical, you have an affirmative obligation to turn me into the bar. 
During the deposition, you asked Jim Harmon if he had ever discussed with Dianne 
Rothe, that her whole gift to the foundation could fail because Jim Hannon named himself as 
a Trustee. That theory which you articulated finds no support in the law. Please review 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(c) which states that a lawyer shall not prepare an 
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling, or K 
spouse any substantial & from client, including a testamentary Rift, cxccpt where the client 
is rclated to the donee, Clearly, 3irn.Hannon as a trustee is not the recipient of any "gift" 
W 
under the trust. Case law tiom other jurisdictions states that a lawler-beneficiarv's 
participation in rhe preparation or execution of tlie Will raises the presumption of undue 
influence, again, Mr. Harmon was not, nor can he be a b-eneficiary under D~anne's Will. A 
similar result is found when you review ABA Cannon 5, ethical consideration 5-6, that states 
a lawyer shall not conscientiously influence a client to name him as Executor, trustee, or 
lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a cllent wishes to name his lawyer as such, 1 4 2  
0 7 / 2 4 / 2 0 0 1  0 3  2 0  F A X  t i542240  John P Whelan, P C 
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J. P. Welan 
Page 2 
December 1,2000 
care shall be taken by ~e lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, I think Mr. 
Hamon covered in his deposition, the fact that it was D i m e  who wished Jim H m o n  and 
her other attorneys, to serve as co-trustees. 
In any event, there are two separate issues. You asked if Jim Hannon had considered 
the fact that he had n m e d  himself as trustee, to be an ethical violation. If vou view it as an 
unethical violation, have a duty to report Mr. Hannon to the bar. An entirely separate 
issue is whether the fact that Jim Hannon is named as a trustee causes the entire gift to fail, 
which is exactly what you insinuated during the deposition. There simply isn't any legal 
basis to support your allegation. 
Next, in the deposition you raised the theory that if these attorney trustees resigned, 
and since there is no provision for replacemerit, the trust would fail. Once again, there is no 
legal theory to support your claim. Please look at Idaho Code $68-101 and Idaho Code 468- 
102- The trust survives the renunciation of other trustees, and if, by chance, all the trustees 
should renounce, the District Court p~& appoint replacements, 
You mentioned that dl of the attorney trustees had renounced their interest in serving 
irs trustees, but that begs the question. The foundation hasn't been created yet, due to your 
client's failure to perform his duties as personal representative. I don't see how any 
renunciation can be valid until the estate kicks loose the funds to create the foundation. 
After the deposition, you asked about the possibility of settlement. The Idaho Trial 
Lawyers Association is certainly interested in settlement. When you discussed settlement, 
you mentioned the possibility of this case being dragged out, and the specter of attorney fees 
reducing the value of any money that could be available for the foundation. I suggest you 
take another look at the probate code to determine who will be paying for your attorney's 
fees. Since the probate was converted to a formal probate, you cannot receive attorney's fees 
out of probate assets without the court's prior approval. While I agree that your office would 
be entitled to attorney's fees for preparing the initial probate pleadings, your office is not 
entitled to any other attorney fees for time spent contesting the validity of the Will. It would 
be unethical for an attorney to charge attorney's fees against the estate for such an action, as 
the personal representative has a duty to the legacies under the Will, to enforce the Will and 
defend the Will, nor contest che Will. Additionally, the personal representative has n duty LO 
maximize the estate left for the legacies. The personal representative simply cannot challenge 
the valihty of the Will, and seek to have his attorney fees for doing so paid from the assets 
from the estate. I direct your attention to Idaho Code 15-3-703(a), Idaho Code Ij 1 5-3-709, 
Idaho Code 5 15-3-712 and Idaho Code $15-3-715(21). 
1 4 3  
J. P. MeIan  
Page 3 
Deccmbcr 1,2000 
I also don't see how you are going to get your attorney fees paid for out of the estate, 
for time spent discussing matters with me, since the vast majority of that time has been spent 
with my trying to get you to get your client to meet his duties under Idaho law ro the 
beneficiaries under the Will. 
My suggestion is as follows. Your client prepares a detailed inventory and accounting 
that can be verified, and find out what is Iefl over after the payment of legitimate expenses. 
This would include itemized statements of the interest bearing account showing what interest 
has accrued since the account's inception, and also what expenses have been paid by the 
estate since the decedent's death and what expenses are claimed and unpaid against the estate. 
The trustees can then convene to determine what is to be done with the remaining funds. 
JTM:cs 
Enc. 
cc: Kay Shields 
f irn Hannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ f d a y  of July. 2001, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
